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Abstract 
In recent years there has been a debate in the statistical civil war literature over the 
effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the risk of ethnic conflict. The conventional 
argument has been that the potential for conflict is higher in countries with many 
ethnic groups than in countries with few ethnic groups. This has been based on the 
core assumption that more groups generally raises coordination costs, which in turn is 
conducive to weak institutions, corruption and eventually higher risk of conflict. 
Recently, this notion has been challenged by those who contend that the risk of 
conflict is highest when there are only two large groups in a country. Under such 
conditions the system is likely to become highly polarized, thus increasing the 
probability of conflict. According to this argument, more groups would in fact reduce 
interethnic tension. In parallel, a third line of thought has been advanced that departs 
from the question of numbers and instead focuses on the relative size of the ethnic 
groups. This argument has suggested that the risk of conflict should be highest in 
systems where the largest group has a dominant position, yet without complete control. 
In such situations the majority will be tempted to abuse its power over the minorities, 
leading eventually to a revolt by one or more of the excluded groups. 
All in all, there has been limited statistical support for either of these arguments, 
prompting the inevitable question of whether ethnic heterogeneity has any particular 
effect on the risk of conflict at all. As such, the ambiguity of the results has played into 
the well-known debate over greed versus grievances, and has effectively weakened the 
case for those who uphold that ethnicity is a relevant determinant of civil war onsets. 
In this thesis I argue that the reason why the results have been ambiguous is not that 
ethnic heterogeneity is irrelevant. Rather, it is because the tests conducted have either 
lacked proper theoretical foundation; been based on over-aggregated data, confounded 
the different dimensions of ethnic heterogeneity; or generally struggled with the 
methodological challenges inherent in research involving the concept of ethnicity. The 
ambition of this thesis is to remedy some of these shortcomings and provide a better 
understanding of how the landscape of ethnic heterogeneity affects the risk of conflict 
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in multiethnic states. More specifically, it is to examine whether some multiethnic 
configurations are more prone to conflict than others. 
To answer this question, I propose two new measures by which the landscape of ethnic 
heterogeneity can be mapped. The first is concerned with the number of groups while 
the second focuses on with the potential effect of dominance by a large majority. In 
testing these measures on a new dataset of ethnic groups compiled by Wimmer et.al 
(2009) I find considerable support for the conventional argument that countries with a 
fragmented ethnic landscape – i.e. many groups – have a higher risk of ethnic conflict 
than countries with few ethnic groups. These results are consistent across different 
datasets of civil wars and ethnic groups. I find less support for the notion that 
dominance increases the risk of ethnic conflict in general, but when disaggregating the 
dependent variable into conflicts over territory and conflicts over government I find 
that dominance is in fact a significant determinant for territorial conflicts, but not for 
conflicts over government. The opposite seems to be the case for fragmentation; it is 
significant for government conflicts, but not for territorial ones. I conclude by making 
the case that the two core dimensions introduced to map the landscape of ethnic 
heterogeneity – fragmentation and balance – could serve as the basis for a 
classification of multiethnic states, which in turn can facilitate more qualitatively 
oriented studies of the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the risk of civil war. 
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1 Introduction 
The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a phenomenon to be 
understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied. 
Horowitz (1985:XV) 
 
In May 2009, the world sat back and watched as the Sri Lankan army launched is final 
devastating attack on the last remaining forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
– the Tamil Tigers. The ferocious campaign egged on by President Mahinda Rajapakse 
seemingly ended the civil war that had ravaged the country since its violent inception 
in august 1983 (BBC 2010a; Rotberg 1999:72). In the eyes of many observers, 
however, the defeat of the Tamil Tigers ended nothing but the actual fighting. A 
peaceful solution, under which the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority on the 
island could live in peaceful coexistence, seems as distant as ever. No viable answers 
have been found on questions such as regional autonomy, minority rights and perhaps 
most importantly; language (Horowitz 2000; Polgreen 2009; Reddy 2007).  
Many skeptics believe, moreover, that such solutions will not be found, and that Sri 
Lanka is destined to remain in a state of ethnic quarreling, tension and dispute, and a 
prime reason for this is attributed to ethnicity and language. Spoken by something 
close to 20 percent of the population Tamil is an official language, yet few Sinhalese 
speak it. The Tamils insist that English should be the common language, but the 
Sinhalese do not see why a country with an overwhelming Sinhala majority should not 
have Sinhalese as the main administrative language.  
The above scenario constitutes a fascinating challenge for a peace mediator, yet for the 
peace researcher the case of Sri Lanka points to a more profound question. Might it be 
that Sri Lanka represents a typical case; that countries with the same ethnic setup 
would exhibit similar patterns of tension and political dynamics? And does this 
constellation of a clear majority facing a relatively large minority represent a 
particularly conflict-prone type of multiethnic state? 
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One could plausibly imagine that if Sri Lanka had more than two main languages the 
question could actually have been easier to solve. In South Africa, with its 11 official 
languages, it is evident for all parties that all of these cannot be learned by everyone. 
And a common language of administration is, after all, something of a precondition for 
a functioning modern state. In South Africa the lingua franca has become English, 
despite the limited number of South Africans who claim English as their mother 
tongue.1
The case of Sri Lanka indicates another dimension that has been pondered in the 
academic debate on ethnic heterogeneity and civil war. Sri Lanka is not merely an 
example of a case where a limited number of groups become an “ethnic witches’ 
brew”, to quote Tanja Ellingsen (2000), but also a case in which a dominant majority 
uses – and some would say abuses – its power over the minority, setting in motion 
feelings of resentment and frustration among the minority. In short, it is a case of 
ethnic dominance. Such constellations, it has been argued (see e.g. Horowitz 1985, 
Collier & Hoeffler 2004), tend to push the minority to the point where it decides to 
launch some form of retaliatory action; in the name of justice and the right to self-
determination. 
 A similar situation reigns in India, and even more so in the ethnically 
atomized country of Papua New Guinea, with its round about 800 ethnic groups (see 
e.g. Reilly 2000). But does this imply that multiethnic societies with large numbers of 
groups are always more stable than countries with only two main ethnic groups? One 
might be eluded to think so, and as I will return to shortly some statistical research has 
also pointed in this direction.  
The examples of Rwanda and Burundi – where large Hutu majorities share their 
territories with strong and coherent Tutsi minorities – seductively serve to reinforce 
the impression that two groups in a highly unbalanced ethnic configuration will 
eventually come to explode (see e.g. Uvin 1999). More recently, the ethnic fallout 
between the Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek minority following the ousting of the 
Kyrgyz president Bakiyev in April 2010 further strengthens the suspicion in the minds 
                                              
1 English is the preferred language of business, politics and media, and is generally understood around the 
country. See  http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/language.htm 
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of the lay observer – the suspicion that a constellation of ethnic groups where a large 
majority faces a large minority might possibly be the most conflict-prone system of all 
(BBC 2010b). Ethnic conflict in such countries may almost seem unavoidable. 
Fortunately – or unfortunately – the picture is not that simple. First, there are more 
than enough examples of stable and well functioning states with ethnic configurations 
similar to Sri Lanka to rebuke such notions of inevitability. Canada works quite well, 
despite having only two main ethnic communities, one of which is considerably larger 
than the other. So too does Jordan, Togo, Cuba, Kuwait and Estonia, all with similar 
majority-minority configurations. Secondly, ethnic conflicts are by no means limited 
to countries with only two main groups where a dominant majority faces a large 
minority. When the post-election violence erupted in Kenya in late 2007, analysts were 
quick to point out that Kenyan politics have been marred by ethnic and tribal 
infighting precisely because there were so many groups (see e.g. Hanson 2008). 
Kenya, with its 40-odd ethnic groups, thus seems to point in the opposite direction of 
Sri Lanka; that ethnic fragmentation increases the risk of conflict.2
These examples draw the attention to what has been a primary line of disagreement in 
statistical research on ethnic heterogeneity and conflict; whether more groups increase 
or reduce the risk of conflict. It was long taken almost for granted that ethnically 
fragmented societies – understood here and henceforth as countries with a relatively 
large number of ethnic groups – would be particularly prone to conflict due to 
increased coordination costs, cooperation problems and a general notion of the more 
the messier (see e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Ellingsen 2000; Sambanis 2001; Collier 
& Hoeffler 2004; Buhaug 2006). Recently, this notion has been contested and it has 
been argued that the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and conflict is in fact 
non-monotonic; that the most conflict-prone systems are those where only two major 
groups exist, as in Rwanda or Eritrea (see e.g. Esteban & Ray 1994, 1999, 2008; 
Reynal-Querol 2002; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005). Under such conditions the 
 
                                              
2 This notion of an increase in levels of fragmentation is a theoretical concept. It does not suggest, nor suppose, 
that the number of groups in a country actually changes over night. Rather, it depicts the analytical exercise of 
studying countries with different numbers of ethnic groups. An increase in fragmentation thus implies that you 
go from studying a country with few groups to studying a country with many groups.  
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political landscape would become polarized and gradually drive the two groups apart. 
A third argument in the debate over ethnic heterogeneity has been linked to the notion 
of dominance and to the assumption that large majorities tend to exclude ethnic 
minorities from power, leading to frustration and grievances that eventually cause 
minorities to rebel (see e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 2004). As such, the statistical research 
on ethnic heterogeneity and conflict has been a debate over numbers, and more 
specifically, over how the number and relative size of the ethnic groups in a given 
country affect the potential for armed conflict.  
There have been few conclusive results in the tests of these hypotheses. Some findings 
suggest that more groups does indeed increase the risk of conflict (e.g. Sambanis 
2001), while others find that fragmentation is relevant only for conflicts over territory, 
but not for conflicts over government (e.g. Buhaug 2006). Others again argue that the 
number of groups affects the intensity of conflict, so that conflict can be expected to 
occur more often in highly fragmented societies, but these conflicts will be less 
devastating than if conflict erupts in countries with few groups (Esteban & Ray 2008). 
A fourth line of argument suggests that the most important factor determining ethnic 
conflict is the degree of minority exclusion (e.g. Cederman & Girardin 2007). 
The only certain conclusion to be drawn from all these contributions is that the debate 
over ethnic heterogeneity and conflict is itself in a state of fragmentation, for which a 
lack of clear and unambiguous findings must take part of the blame. There are several 
possible reasons why the results have not been conclusive. The most obvious of these 
would be that there is no particular pattern to find – that ethnic heterogeneity has no 
measurable effect on the risk of conflict. Before coming to terms with such a 
conclusion, however, there are several lines of critique that should be dealt with, and 
methodological shortcomings that should be scrutinized. These range from the manner 
in which ethnicity is coded, via the theoretical foundation upon which the hypotheses 
are predicated, to the dependent variables with which the tests have been conducted. 
Herein lays ample scope for improvement, which is also part of the motivation for the 
undertaking of this project. 
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The fact is that even though the debate is fragmented, it is by no means irrelevant. 
There are indeed several reasons why a better understanding of the relationship 
between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict would be useful. First, it would provide – in 
combination with other determinants of ethnic conflict – some clue as to whether a 
given country has a particularly volatile ethnic composition. Special attention could 
then be given to these countries in terms of monitoring developments that might 
trigger the mechanisms expected to drive the country towards conflict. This does not 
imply that the knowledge of some ethnic constellations being more volatile than others 
would automatically translate into practical measures for peace-building. On the 
contrary; in and of itself, it is of little use for Kenya or Sri Lanka to know that the 
ethnic configuration in their particular country would be among the most conflict-
prone types of multiethnic systems.  
For the research on ethnic heterogeneity to have practical implications on policy it will 
need go beyond the mere mapping of tendencies, and provide insight into the political 
dynamics and specific mechanics that cause civil wars to erupt. Only then can policies 
aimed at mitigating the risk of conflict be devised and implemented with any credible 
chance of success. Such insight however, can only be obtained through more 
qualitatively oriented studies that compare systems in order to locate and fully 
understand the mechanism at play. As Donald Horowitz states it in his seminal work 
on the topic, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985:13); “the need for comparative analysis 
is compelling”. And this points to the second reason why statistical mapping of 
conflict risk is an important exercise. 
For comparative studies to yield meaningful results it is a plain precondition that they 
be guided by some basic parameters of classification that enables the researcher to 
distinguish between most similar and least similar systems. The units under study must 
be placed into meaningful categories that indicate what it is that is to be compared, 
“for the simple reason that comparison requires comparability” (Horowitz 1985:16). 
And this is where the statistical research on ethnic heterogeneity can serve a purpose, 
in providing indications as to what these parameters ought to be and to where the 
thresholds for classification should be placed. 
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The ambition of this thesis is thus twofold: First, to revisit the questions of how the 
number of groups and their relative size affects the risk of ethnic conflict, with the 
composite aims of strengthening the theoretical foundations of the hypotheses, of 
developing measures that reliably measure the notions laid down in these hypotheses, 
and of improving the viability of the tests by using new sources of data. The second 
ambition of the thesis is to use the results of these tests to draw the contours of a 
classification by which multiethnic systems can be categorized and compared. In sum, 
this could be contracted into the following core research question: 
Are some multiethnic configurations more prone to conflict than others? 
1.1 Structure 
The thesis is structured into four main parts, in addition to this introduction and a set 
of concluding remarks. The first of these parts, Chapter 2, introduces the academic 
debate on ethnic heterogeneity and provides a theoretical foundation upon which a set 
of hypotheses is developed. Chapter 3 deals with the operationalization of these 
hypotheses, while Chapter 4 discusses methodological issues related to the statistical 
study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. In Chapter 5, the results of the tests are laid out 
and discussed. Each chapter starts with a short introduction that lays out the main 
elements and arguments of the chapter. 
It should be noted that throughout the paper the concepts of civil war and armed 
conflict generally refer to ethnically motivated civil wars, in which a minimum of 25 
people have been killed during the course of one year and the fighting fractions hail 
from different ethnic groups. More elaborate definitions of ethnic civil wars are 
provided in Chapter 4. 
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2 Background & Theoretical Approach 
In this chapter the previous literature on the subject of ethnic heterogeneity and 
conflict is introduced and discussed, with a particular focus on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research. Three different arguments are identified: (i) that the 
risk of ethnic conflict increases with the more groups; (ii) that the risk of ethnic 
conflict is highest with only two large groups, and; (iii) that the risk of conflict is 
highest when one group dominates, but not overwhelmingly so. These arguments are 
then mapped along two main dimensions (fragmentation and balance) that serve as 
the basis for a framework of classification. The second part of the chapter aims to 
strengthen the theoretical foundation for this framework by bringing in concepts and 
ideas both from the field of international relations and from political science. The 
chapter ends with a summary of the main arguments and the formulation of four 
concrete hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussions. 
 
Over the last two centuries, the share of wars fought in the name of national liberation 
or ethnic autonomy has risen steadily; from a mere 20 percent in the 19th century to an 
average of about 45 percent for the period between 1919 and 1989. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the share of such wars has reached a staggering 75 percent (Wimmer 
et.al 2006, 2009). According to the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch 
et.al. 2002) more than 90 percent of the wars since 1990 have also been either internal 
or so-called internationalized internal conflicts. These developments have prompted a 
bourgeoning scholarly debate on the causes and consequences of internal ethnic 
conflict – or ethnic civil war. 
2.1 Fractionalization – the more the messier 
In the large N literature on civil war, the debate on ethnicity has revolved largely 
around the concept of ethnic heterogeneity, with the aim of identifying patterns that 
could indicate whether some varieties of multiethnic states are more prone to conflict 
than others (see Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Ellingsen 2000; Doyle & Sambanis 
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2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Esteban & Ray 1999, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal Querol 
2005; Cederman & Girardin 2007). Early attempts to test the socio-economic impact 
of ethnic heterogeneity statistically started from the assumption that an increase in the 
number of ethnic groups in a given country would, ceteris paribus, increase the costs 
of coordination. Based on a rationality drawn from the field of economics, this was in 
turn assumed to cause higher levels of corruption, reduced investments and less 
diffusion of technology, all of which could be associated with a higher risk of ethnic 
conflict (see Mauro 1995; Easterly & Levine 1997; La Porta et.al. 1999; Alesina et.al 
1999, 2003).  
The measure employed to test this relationship was an index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) that calculated the chance that two randomly selected persons 
from a given country belong to the same ethnic group. The index was based on data 
from the Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) – a global overview of ethnic groups compiled by 
a Soviet research institute in the early ‘60s (USSR 1964).  
Despite its widespread use, the ELF index has not yielded convincing results in terms 
of explaining the outbreak of civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol 2005; Hegre & Sambanis 2006). To some extent, this could be attributed to the 
fact that the index was developed as a tool for measuring inequality and economic 
fractionalization, which, it has been argued, has a different and more indirect effect on 
conflict than do ethnic group constellations. Ethnic groups have a dynamic of their 
own, which is hard to capture by the methodological individualism associated with 
economic theory (see e.g. Posner 2004, Cramer 2002). In the words of Cederman & 
Girardin (2007:173), the ELF-index “has yet to be supported by a convincing set of 
causal mechanisms that links it to political violence”. 
2.2 Polarization – less is more 
More recently and partly driven by the relatively weak results obtained by the ELF-
index, an alternative hypothesis has been advanced. Several authors have suggested 
that the relationship between the number of ethnic groups and the risk of conflict is 
‘non-monotonic’ (Esteban & Ray 1994, 1999; Reynal-Querol 2000; Montalvo & 
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Reynal-Querol 2005). More specifically, it is assumed that the risk of conflict is at its 
highest when two groups are juxtaposed in a bifurcated or so-called bipolar system, 
and that the risk of conflict falls exponentially with an increase in the number of 
groups. 
In advancing this argument Esteban & Ray (1994) draw largely on Marxist theory. 
They refer to Karl Deutsch (1971) who explains that as the struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat advances, the relationship becomes more and more 
antagonistic, a process he labels polarization. On this basis, Esteban & Ray (1994) 
proceed to develop a measure of polarization which is maximized on a scale from 0 to 
1 when the two largest groups make up 50% each (½, 0, 0,… ½). From this bipolar 
peak, the values on the index approach zero either if you move towards 
homogenization or towards fractionalization. This non-monotonic relationship 
between the number of groups and the risk of conflict constitutes the most important 
difference between the fractionalization and the polarization indexes. Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol (2005) elaborate and test the differences between the two measures and 
with a simplified version of the polarization index they show that it is significantly 
better at explaining conflict than is fractionalization. 
Despite these findings, the polarization index does have some precarious 
shortcomings, the first and most important of which is the rather arbitrary link between 
the theoretical hypothesis and the empirical evidence. Using Marxist theory to explain 
ethnic conflict sounds, to some extent, like a contradiction in terms. At the core of 
Marxist theory lies the idea that economic boundaries can be transcended; that the 
poor can become richer and the rich become poorer. This view starkly contrasts with 
the rather static properties associated with ethnicity and ethnic groups. One does not 
simply change ethnic group, even if, as most sociologist and anthropologists would 
contend, ethnicity is a fluid concept (Jenkins 1997, Lijphart 1977, Eriksen 1993). I 
return to this in Chapter 4. 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) seem to have grasped this dilemma, and in their 
attempt to link the polarization hypothesis to ethnic conflict theory they turn to Donald 
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Horowitz (1985) instead of Karl Deutsch (1971). In his seminal work Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict (1985) Horowitz provides a plethora of empirically induced hypotheses. The 
trouble is that he barely mentions the question of numerical balance between groups, 
and when he does, it is to illustrate the limitations of democratic government in 
ethnically dominated societies (Horowitz 1985:629). His contention is that in a system 
where group A constitute 60 percent of the population and group B make up the 
remaining 40 percent, there is no prospect for group B of ever gaining electoral 
majority and government control, regardless of the electoral rules employed. Rather 
than theoretically underpinning the polarization argument, as was seemingly the aim of 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, this argument points to a third hypothesis advanced in the 
literature, namely that of ethnic dominance.  
2.3 Dominance – this land is my land 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) elaborate on this argument of dominance and hypothesize 
that the propensity of an ethnic group to seek domination should increase in proportion 
to its share of the population. A group constituting 90 percent of the total will hence be 
more inclined to dominate, and in effect discriminate, than a group of only 45 percent. 
That said, they also suggest that “the incentive to exploit the minority diminishes the 
smaller is the minority, since there is less potential for exploitation” (Collier & 
Hoeffler 2004:13, italics added). On this basis they conclude that the risk of ethnic 
conflict as a result of exclusion should be highest in countries where the largest ethnic 
group constitutes “a majority, but not an overwhelming majority” (Ibid.). This notion 
coincides with the so-called hegemonic stability theory, which assumes that once an 
actor has gained hegemonic status (i.e. an overwhelming majority), the system will be 
pacified since no group or coalition of groups will have the resources to challenge its 
position. The hegemonic power will then turn its attention to providing collective 
goods, such as security at sea, which in turn reinforces stability. Political scientists 
often point to the classic cases of the Pax Romana and the Pax Britannica as examples 
of this. William Wohlforth (2006) argues that the United States today functions as a 
hegemonic pacifier, and he believes that this Pax Americana is likely to endure for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Collier & Hoeffler (2004) go on to test the ethnic dominance hypothesis by employing 
a binary variable that codes countries as ethnically dominant if the largest group make 
up between 45 and 90 percent of the population.  While they do find some statistical 
support for the hypothesis, this binary variable is by no means a perfect measure of 
ethnic dominance. For one, there is a logical flaw in the assumption that a group 
constituting 45 percent of the population should qualify as dominant. Not because it 
would not dominate – in most cases it probably would – but because whether or not it 
does necessarily depends on how the remaining 55 percent of the population is 
constituted. If only one other group exists (i.e. of 55 percent) it makes little sense to 
speak of an ethnically dominant society. In fact, such a setup would more closely 
resemble the bipolar system assumed to be the most volatile under the polarization 
argument. This notion is seemingly confirmed by Esteban & Ray’s (2008:166) rather 
confusing interpretation of Collier & Hoeffler’s dominance variable as “an alternative 
and considerably cruder specification of polarization”. Theoretically, it is necessary to 
distinguish between these two concepts – polarization and dominance – since they 
purport to measure different underlying mechanisms. 
A better way to measure the concept of ethnic dominance would be to create a variable 
similar and comparable to the fractionalization and polarization indexes that could 
maximize the value of dominance somewhere between 45 and 90 percent. Such a 
measure could mitigate the above problems by also taking into consideration the size 
of the opposition, and thus linking it closer to the theoretical concepts of dominance. 
Horowitz uses the example of a 60-40 distribution to illustrate the problems of 
dominance and exclusion, but he does not purport to establish this particular 
constellation of groups as the most volatile ethnic configuration. He makes no such 
contention. The ‘risk peak’ might equally well be situated around 75-25, at which 
point even constitutional changes can be pushed through democratically by the 
majority, while the minority remains big enough to retain reasonable prospects of 
forced resistance.  The uncertainty with regards to the point of maximum conflict risk 
suggests that an ethnic dominance index should allow for the adjustment of the peak 
point, in order to locate the best fit empirically. 
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2.4 Three arguments – two dimensions 
If we now attempt to summarize the three arguments introduced above, we can 
identify two main dimensions along which these align themselves; namely the number 
of groups and the balance between them. The fractionalization measure assumes that 
the risk of conflict increases alongside the number of groups in the system, while 
polarization assumes that the likelihood of conflict is maximized when two equally 
sized groups compose 50 percent each. Both measures implicitly assume that the risk 
of conflict is highest when all the groups are relatively equal in size; that is when the 
system is balanced. The third argument, regarding ethnic dominance, breaks with this 
view and suggests that the risk of conflict will be higher in systems where one group 
dominates over the others, yet it concurs with the polarization argument in assuming 
that tension is maximized with only two groups, since the potential for exploitation 
increases in proportion to the size of the largest minority. I will return to this in the 
subsequent section. Figure 1 captures these two dimensions and illustrates how the 
measures and hypotheses are placed accordingly.  
The model provides an overview of the hypotheses and measures previously employed 
in the quest for patterns of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. Yet, as the above 
discussion indicates, there are methodological challenges associated with each of these 
measures. Both fractionalization and polarization are neatly constructed indexes that 
reliably capture their intended concepts. The problem is that these concepts lack 
proper theoretical foundation, and as such one is effectively faced with a validity 
problem. Validity can generally be understood as the extent to which a measure tests 
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what it is intended to test. Hence, if the theoretical foundation upon which the measure 
is constructed is uncertain, it becomes difficult to make “accurate inferences based on 
the test scores” (Weathington et.al 2010:87). 
For Collier & Hoeffler’s (2004) dominance measure, reliability appears to be a bigger 
concern than validity. The theoretical foundation is sound, but the measure itself is 
crude. Weathington et.al (2010:84) describes reliability as the “consistency with which 
observations or measurements are made”, and since, as explained above, Collier & 
Hoeffler’s binary variable risks coding fully balanced systems as dominant, there is 
likely to be considerable measurement error in the results. The methodological 
challenge is thus threefold; to provide a theoretical basis for the two first measures, 
and to improve the reliability of the third. 
2.5 Towards a framework for comparison 
In order to do this, we need a better framework for comparison – one that enables a 
more comprehensive approach to the theoretical constructs of the debate. Despite 
extensive research into the causes and nature of ethnic conflicts over the last decades, 
the theoretical framework for comparing different types of multiethnic systems 
remains weak. In the words of Esteban & Schneider; “much more theoretical work 
needs to be developed, seeking convincing explanations for the usage of armed force 
across different political and social systems” (2008:135, italics added). Horowitz 
(1985:13) similarly contends that it is not a lack of data that inhibits further research 
on ethnic conflicts, but a lack of what Giovanni Sartori (1970) calls ‘data containers’ – 
meaning categories within which to classify the data. Sartori (1970:1039), in turn, 
asserts that “regardless of whether we rely on quantitative data or on more qualitative 
information, […] the problem is the same, namely, to construct fact-finding categories 
that own sufficient discriminating power”. In short, there is need for a proper 
classification of multiethnic states that allows for the exercise of comparison. 
In his seminal work on the topic of ethnic conflict, Horowitz (1985) lays out some 
important distinctions between varieties of multiethnic states, notably the divide 
between ranked and unranked systems and between advanced and backward groups 
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and regions. He suggests that each of these types will have their own dynamics and 
will thus require different remedies to mitigate potential conflict. These distinctions 
undoubtedly serve a purpose, yet Horowitz largely bypasses the task of categorizing 
multiethnic systems according to numerical criteria – that is the number of groups and 
the balance between them. If the ultimate aim of the research on conflict in 
multiethnic societies is to be able to provide insight into how the inter-ethnic dynamics 
of say Afghanistan differs from that of Kyrgyzstan, this knowledge gap needs filling. 
Granted, such a perspective axiomatically presupposes that the numerical distribution 
of groups in a system actually matters, a notion that in and of itself merits scrutiny. But 
for the purpose of classification, numbers might be the best criteria available. That 
said, the exercise of counting ethnic groups should by no means be portrayed as 
simple, a topic I will return to later. In general, however, the epistemological approach 
adopted in this paper aligns with the view expressed by Sartori (1990:318) in his study 
of political party systems, in which he states that “it is not whether the number of 
parties matters – it does – but whether a numerical criterion of classification enables us 
to get hold of what matters”. 
The overview in Figure 1 provides a useful starting point for developing a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework, with its two basic dimensions; the number of 
groups and the balance between them. Yet, for the theoretical mapping of the various 
hypotheses, we might need to look beyond the relatively contracted scope of ethnic 
conflict theory. Esteban & Schneider (2008) recognize this as they turn to the fields of 
economics, political science and international relations (IR) in order to underpin the 
various assumptions of the ethnic heterogeneity debate. In the field of IR the question 
of ‘polarity’ has been argued over for decades, or even centuries (Morgenthau 2006), 
and the most prominent arguments closely resemble those of the ethnic heterogeneity 
debate.  
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2.6 The domestic analogy – extending the theoretical toolbox 
There is of course a question of whether, and to what extent, theories aimed at 
explaining behavior in the international system can be projected onto the domain of 
domestic politics. Esteban & Schneider (2008:135) suggest that from a “universalist 
perspective, the mechanisms that drive a system of states into war should be identical 
to those that increase the risk of violence among competing groups”. Others would 
argue that there is a fundamental difference in the degree to which domestic politics 
reflect the anarchic foundations of the international system (see Bull 1977, Suganami 
1989).  
This touches upon the long-standing debate in IR over the utility of the ‘domestic 
analogy’ - that is the “presumptive reasoning which holds that there are certain 
similarities between domestic and international phenomena” (Suganami 1989:1). 
Scholars like Hedley Bull have been critical of this notion. He perceives the world of 
states is a sui generis – a special case – and consequently argues that the 
individualistic approaches to domestic politics have only very limited power to explain 
the dynamics of the international system (Ibid; Bull 1977). On the other hand, the 
study of multiethnic states arguably escapes much of Bull’s criticism, since the main 
units of analysis are the ethnic groups, not the individual citizens of each polity. As 
such, one could contend that the politics of multiethnic states is in fact more 
reminiscent of the interaction between states in the international system than of that in 
an ethnically homogenous nation-state. It is precisely for this reason John Stuart Mill 
famously concludes that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up 
of different nationalities” (Mill 1926:120), since the dynamics of such a country would 
make the creation of free institutions as challenging as establishing democracy on an 
international level. 
Such a perspective on multiethnic states – as a hybrid between the non-ethnic domestic 
level and the international system level – suggests that the theoretical postulates for an 
analytical framework of multiethnic states can be drawn both from political science 
and from international relations.  
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2.7 IR-rationality – strife and stability in a world of states 
One of the most basic concepts in the study of international relations – and particularly 
within the realist school of thought – is that of balance-of-power (see e.g. Schelling 
1980; Morgenthau 2006). At the heart of this notion lies the recognition of power as a 
perpetual force for both good and bad, and of deterrence as a necessary strategy for 
limiting the excessive use and abuse of power. Since the pioneering political juggling 
and Raison d’état of Cardinal Richelieu in the 17th century, via the Realpolitik of the 
Metternich system in the first half of the 19th century, European powers have become 
accustomed to this manner of thinking (Kissinger 1994). The stability of the system 
was predicated upon a tacit, and sometimes even explicit, agreement that no state 
could be allowed to dominate, and that alliances would have to be forged with this 
fundamental aim in mind.   
As such, the balance-of-power theory neatly fits into the first dimension introduced in 
the framework above, as it assumes that balanced systems will be more stable than 
unbalanced systems. The question of whether more actors increase or reduce stability 
received little attention in the early days, partly because the concepts and strategies 
were derived from, and adapted to, the political landscape of Europe, in which the 
number of actors remained relatively stable once the major states of the continent were 
consolidated. But with the advent of the cold war, and the apparent bipolarization of 
world politics that ensued, scholars started pondering whether a power-balance with 
only two major powers might actually be more stable than the multipolar herd of war-
mongering states that all played to their own tune during the Concert of Europe.  
2.8 Structuring the realist argument 
Kenneth Waltz (1964), a founding figure of the IR-school of so-called structural 
realism, argues that bipolarity represents the ultimate form of international stability, 
since it minimizes uncertainty and allows decision-makers to better assess the 
preferences of a potential foe. He starts from the assumption that the primary concern 
of each unit in the system is survival, and that the actions of states can be understood 
largely in such terms. Somewhat counter-intuitively Waltz induces from this 
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assumption that the international system, with its generally anarchic features, will be 
competitive in nature, even if states do not have any specific conflicts of interest 
(Glaser 2010:20). The explanation for this mechanism lies in the classic perception of 
the security dilemma, in which the uncertain intentions of other actors makes it 
rational to act preemptively.  
Upon these basic assumptions, John Mearsheimer draws the contours of a typology for 
the international system. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) he describes 
three main types of systems, all linked to the pivotal concept of balance-of-power; (i) 
bipolarity, (ii) unbalanced multipolarity, and (iii) balanced multipolarity. A bipolar 
international system is understood as a system in which two large actors are 
juxtaposed and where neither has the power to exercise control over the other. Smaller 
actors in the system then align themselves with either of the two major powers. The 
second concept, unbalanced multipolarity, implies that one actor is dominant in size 
and power compared to either of the other groups. But the dominant actor does not 
necessarily wield power over the whole system, and the smaller actors can potentially 
align to counter the strength of the dominant power. It can thus be defined as a system 
of multiple poles in which one state has the potential to become a hegemonic power. In 
a system of balanced multipolarity there is no clear dominant actor with the ambition 
or power to control the system. 
Mearsheimer argues that between these, bipolarity should be the most stable, since the 
relationship between only two main actors reduces uncertainty, fear and the risk of 
miscalculation. He believes that all states, and in particular ‘great powers’, will seek 
hegemony whenever they can, since that is the most effective manner of ensuring 
survival (Dunne & Schmidt 2005:169-170). This leads him to conclude that 
unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable type of international system, since the 
smaller powers will be chronically skeptical of the ‘inevitable’ hegemonic aspirations 
of the largest power, and because they will aim, as far as they can, to contain these 
aspirations. Finally, balanced multipolarity falls somewhere in between the two 
former. It is seen as less stable than bipolarity, but more stable than unbalanced 
multipolarity, since the fear of one group achieving status as hegemon is limited 
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(Mearsheimer 2001). In sum, Mearsheimer holds that balanced systems are likely to 
be more stable than unbalanced systems, and that bipolar systems will be more stable 
than multipolar systems. He thus provides a theoretical basis that underpins both the 
fractionalization argument and the ethnic dominance argument, deeming the latter as 
the least stable. 
2.9 Unless more is actually merrier 
That said there is little agreement among IR scholars regarding these conclusions 
(Geller & Singer 1998:113). In contrast to the structural realists, Deutsch & Singer 
(1964:390) make the case for multipolar stability, suggesting that “as the system 
moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war 
should be expected to diminish”. They base their argument on the notion that stability 
is contingent on the number of possible relationships in the system – what they refer to 
as ‘interaction opportunities’. When every bilateral relationship is counted, a system of 
three groups would have three interaction opportunities (A-B, A-C, B-C). With four 
groups, the number increases to six (A-B, A-C, A-D, B-C, B-D, C-D). More groups 
thus increase the potential for interaction exponentially. The assertion is that the 
increased number of possible coalitions dampens the potential for conflict. An 
underlying assumption for Deutsch & Singer appears to be that multipolar systems are 
divided by crosscutting cleavages that make some actors natural interaction partners 
on certain issues, but not on others. This thinking closely mirrors Arendt Lijphart’s 
(1977) view of crosscutting cleavages as stabilizing factors in multiethnic societies. 
Alliances formed under such conditions will be less stringent, more flexible and more 
open to compromise than if the system had only two groups – in particular if these two 
groups are separated by multiple overlapping segmental cleavages. And with 
flexibility comes stability – presumably.  This branch of IR theory thus provides a 
theoretical basis for the polarization argument, as it assumes that the risk of conflict 
will diminish with an increase in the number of groups. 
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2.10 Polarized confusion 
A potential source of confusion at this point is the manner in which the IR debate 
employs the term ‘polarity’. As mentioned, Deutsch (1971) perceived of polarization 
as a process of gradually increasing antagonism between two or more parties. The 
logical implication of this view is that a system cannot a priori be defined as polarized. 
Horowitz (1985) argues along the same lines when he suggests that there is an inherent 
tendency in most systems towards bipolarity, regardless of the actual number of 
groups. He ponders why it is that “despite the plurality of groups in an environment 
(rarely there are only two), polarity frequently emerges”, and he suggests that an 
‘economy of antipathy’ causes pairs of antagonists to emerge as “comparative 
reference groups” (Horowitz 1985:182, original parentheses). Polarization thus 
understood is a process, not a static property by which different systems can be 
categorized. It follows from this that a system of multiple groups could easily become 
bipolar, as long as the groups align on either side of one main cleavage.  
Therefore, if the ambition of a classification of multiethnic societies is to say 
something about each system type’s relative potential for armed conflict, it is 
important not to confuse the static criteria for classification with the dynamic effects 
and presumed mechanisms that the units of the different categories are thought to 
exhibit. The criteria for classification should be limited to factors that remain relatively 
constant over time, such as the number of groups and their relative size.  
2.11 Into the realm of political science 
Adherence to this principle has arguably been stronger in the domain of political 
science than in that of international relations. The previously mentioned Giovanni 
Sartori is notably famous for his work on a typology of political party systems. One of 
his primary assertions is that the a priori classification based on numbers should be 
distinguished from the dynamics typically associated with the different classes. He 
refers to this as the difference between classes of systems and types of systems – i.e. 
the difference between a classification and a typology (Sartori 1970, 1990). The 
former simply amounts to a counting exercise, albeit guided by certain counting rules, 
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while the latter focuses on the system itself and the behavioral incentives it instills on 
the different actors. 
Sartori (1990) lists a total of seven classes 
within which democratic party systems can be 
categorized (see List 1). These range from one-
party systems, where there is only one party in 
existence (i.e. homogenous), via two-party 
systems with the US as the most famous case, to 
limited and extreme pluralism. Between the one-
party system and the two-party system, Sartori 
also identifies hegemonic and predominant systems, of which only the latter is deemed 
competitive. In hegemonic party systems there is no prospect of a second party or 
coalition gaining more than 50 percent of the seats in parliament. Smaller parties are 
accepted only as long as they do not threaten the position of the hegemon. In 
predominant systems the majority party may actually lose power, though this rarely 
happens. Sartori further includes a class he labels atomized party systems, in which the 
number of parties exceeds a threshold beyond which the addition of one more party 
does not affect the overall dynamic of the system. 
Sartori contends that some systems will be more conducive to cooperation, while 
others are relatively more prone to competition. That said, he underlines that it is not 
the amount of competition that matters, but the direction of it (Sartori 1990). For a 
system to remain stable the direction of the political competition ought to be 
centripetal; that is, the political parties should compete over ‘floating voters’ in the 
centre of the political spectrum. A two-party system typically exerts such tendencies, 
with the Republicans and the Democrats in the US as a prime example. In effect, this 
makes the political landscape look bell-shaped with a single peak in the middle, where 
the majority of the voters are situated. For limited pluralism, which Sartori defines as 
having between 3 and 5 relevant parties, the same logic applies, but he notes that as the 
number of parties increases, so does the risk that any given party dissociates itself 
from the established norms of the system and becomes what he calls an ‘anti-system 
List 1 
Sartori’s (1990)  
classification of party systems 
1. One party 
2. Hegemonic party 
3. Predominant party 
4. Two-party 
5. Limited pluralism 
6. Extreme pluralism 
7. Atomized 
21 
 
party’. Such parties, he warns, will generate a second peak in the party landscape, and 
consequently reverse the direction of the competition. The effect will be centrifugal 
competition, or, as Karl Deutsch (1971) calls it; polarization.  
2.12 Strengths and limitations of Sartori’s typology 
The benefit of Sartori’s typology, in contrast to Mearsheimer’s categories, is that it 
distinguishes between the numerical criteria for classification and the presumed 
dynamics that each of the system types are prone to. It further provides a set of 
analytical terms that may come in handy, notably centrifugal and centripetal 
competition as well as the more nuanced thresholds for categorization. These ideas can 
undoubtedly serve a purpose also in the debate on ethnic heterogeneity in multiethnic 
states.  
First, it suggests that a country should be classified by the number of relevant groups, 
not by the number of relevant coalitions. If a country with a large number of groups is 
found to be polarized into only two main camps, as Horowitz’ ‘economy of antipathy’ 
stipulates, this should be seen as an effect, not as a predisposition. Secondly, Sartori’s 
typology suggests that such polarization is a result of centrifugal competition – it is not 
the competition between the groups in itself that causes the polarization, but the 
direction of the competition. Third, Sartori proposes specific thresholds for 
categorizing countries into different classes according to numbers (fragmentation) and 
balance. Sartori does not distinguish clearly between these two dimensions, though 
this hardly poses a problem in terms of transposing the concepts to a multiethnic 
framework.  
A more challenging feature in that regard is the fact that Sartori’s assumptions of the 
direction of competition in the different systems are linked to the concept of ‘floating 
voters’; understood as a person who is open for switching loyalty to a different party 
or group. The problem is that there is a fundamental difference between ethnic 
cleavages and other political cleavages. Generally speaking, political cleavages such as 
geographic, economic or ideological are easier to transcend, less stringent and thus 
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more dynamic. Ethnic cleavages are often deeper and harder to transcend as they are 
kept together by cultural and social boundaries. 
This does not imply that ethnicity is a static property as such, but the fluidity of the 
concept pertains to the contextual and inter-temporal change in the relevance of the 
different ethnic cleavages (see e.g. Eriksen 1993). For instance, before the fall of 
Siyaad Barre in Somalia, the country was largely perceived as ethnically homogenous, 
but over the last 20 years the remnants of the Somali state has been ravaged by inter-
clan rivalries, which, according to the multi-dimensional interpretation of ethnicity 
applied in this thesis, would constitute a clear-cut case of ethnic fragmentation. Yet, 
this does not mean that the cleavages between the clans were easily transcendable or 
irrelevant before 1990. Rather, it indicates that these cleavages were less predominant 
than other cleavages, for one reason or another. Yugoslavia represents a similar case at 
a similar point in time. When Tito’s rule crumbled, the underlying ethnic cleavages 
surfaced and became the most important lines of division. I will return to this topic in 
Chapter 4. For now, it should suffice to say that in ethnically segmented societies the 
cleavages of the political party system tend to correspond largely to the boundaries of 
the ethnic groups, and the number of so-called ‘floating voters’ will therefore be 
limited (Lijphart 1977). The result will typically be a relatively static party system, 
divided along ethnic lines, and the strategy of the political parties will tend to focus on 
intra-ethnic competition since it is virtually impossible to recruit votes from opposing 
ethnic groups. This causes the political landscape to be multi-peaked and competition 
to be centrifugal, leading in turn to polarization (Sartori 1970, 1990; Horowitz 1985). 
By suggesting that an increase in the number of groups increases the risk of anti-
system parties to emerge, Sartori effectively underpins the argument of ethnic 
fragmentation as a factor that increases the risk of conflict. The mechanism that causes 
this risk to increase is the centrifugality of the political forces in the system. More 
groups implies more potential centrifugality, which in turn, and over time, increases 
the chance that one of the groups in the system decides its interests are no longer 
served by succumbing to or supporting the political framework in place. The said 
group could then be expected to employ anti-systemic means in order to change the 
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setup of the system, be it by orchestrating a classic coup d’état or by jumping on the 
secessionist bandwagon. 
2.13 Disaggregating actor aims - territory vs. government 
This raises another question that has received only limited attention in the debate on 
ethnic heterogeneity, namely the question of whether some ethnic constellations are 
mainly prone to a particular type of ethnic conflict. As such it latches on to the debate 
on ‘disaggregation’ that has intensified recently in the civil war literature (see 
Sambanis 2001, Fearon & Laitin 2003; Buhaug 2006, Wimmer et al 2009). According 
to Wimmer et.al (2009:318) “quantitative approaches tend to overaggregate the 
dependent variable and treat ethnic conflicts as though they have uniform causes”. In 
the PRIO/Uppsala conflict dataset, civil wars, or intrastate wars, are coded according 
to the stated aim of the actors, with two alternative forms of incompatibility; 
government and territory (UCDP/ PRIO 2009). The former implies that the 
incompatibility between the parties is focused on the “type of political system, the 
replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition”, while the 
latter concerns the “status of a territory, e.g. […] secession or autonomy (internal 
conflict)” (UCDP/PRIO 2009:4).3
Halvard Buhaug (2006) elaborates on this distinction and tests whether the relative 
capability of a rebel group affects the objective chosen. Among a number of 
interesting findings, herein the indication that democracies are more prone to 
secessionist conflict than non-democracies, he finds that ethnic fractionalization, as 
measured by Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) updated ELF-index, significantly increases the 
risk of territorial conflict, while it has little effect on government conflict. The 
explanation for this goes back to the concept of relative rebel capabilities. Buhaug 
(2006:694) argues that a basic premise for using rebel capability as a determinant of 
the type of conflict is the notion that “capturing the state apparatus requires more 
power and resources than securing limited territorial authority”. Moreover, it 
 
                                              
3 Wimmer et.al. (2009) employ the terms secessionist and non-secessionist to denote the same distinction. The 
meaning is understood to be the same. 
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presupposes that if a rebel group is capable of attaining control of the central 
government, it will inevitably attempt to do so, since such control constitutes “the 
ultimate price” (ibid.). Essentially, this suggests that the objectives and aspirations of a 
given ethnic group will be roughly proportional to its size and power. Hence, “weaker 
dissidents […] may have no other realistic option than to seek autonomy or secession 
for a limited piece of the country” (Ibid.).  
The concepts of size and power are evidently not as simple and straightforward as the 
above argument alludes to. In particular the latter concept of power has been the 
subject of never-ending debates within practically all branches of the social sciences. 
This, of course, also applies to the study of multiethnic states. When the Tutsi minority 
in Burundi manages to maintain control over the Hutu majority for decades, it 
underlines the simple fact that ethnic relations are shaped by more than the sheer 
number of individuals belonging to each group. Horowitz (1985) also hints at this 
when he labels some systems as ranked and others as unranked, and some groups as 
advanced and others as backward.  
It could consequently be argued that a classification of multiethnic states will remain 
hollow without a proper treatment of the concept of power. Yet, it is precisely the near 
insurmountable challenge of operationalizing the concept of power which makes it 
unfit for the overall purpose of this thesis. As noted above, the classification of 
multiethnic states should be based on relatively static criteria that do not change much 
over time, something the notion of power does not easily comply with. Along the same 
lines one could argue that the power relations of groups in multiethnic states are better 
described as effects of other underlying parameters, not as causes in themselves. 
Without exhausting the arguments on either side of this debate, it should be made clear 
that throughout this thesis the concept of power has been placed into the realm of the 
ceteris paribus – of the presuppositions that facilitate the exercise of simplification. A 
number of other group properties also fall into the same category; such as economic 
development, irredentist links, global outreach, historical ties and more. Groups are 
hence discussed and measured solely in terms of their numerical strength, not by other 
parameters that might indicate its relative strength and power in the system. 
25 
 
As for Buhaug (2006), he goes on to contend that the fractionalization measure should 
capture some of this relative capability, yet he does not explicitly deal with the 
question of balance, which, one could argue, should be just as relevant as the mere 
number of groups for determining the rebel objective. In fact, it is tempting to suggest 
that balance should be more important than fragmentation in this regard, especially if 
secession is considered the result of majority dominance and exclusion from power 
(c.f. Collier & Hoeffler 2004). 
This could indicate that the closer a system gets to equilibrium (i.e. balance), the more 
prone it will be to conflict over government, since the prospects for any given minority 
to take control of the state (the ultimate price) will then be at its highest. Conversely, 
in dominant and even more so in hegemonic systems, the likely strategy of a rebel 
group will be to aim for autonomy or secession, since the prospects for taking over the 
state and keeping it are slim, to say the least. In hegemonic systems, however, the 
capability of the minority to initiate any form of rebellion should be lower than in 
dominant systems, since the discrepancy between majority control and minority 
capability is higher. This conforms to the dominance argument advanced by Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004). 
The notions of majority control and minority capabilities admittedly rest upon the 
premise that the majority is in fact in control of the state in question and that it is the 
minority that rebels. That is of course not always the case, something the Tutsi control 
in Rwanda and Burundi are examples of.4
                                              
4 The Tutsi make up approximately 10-15 percent of the population in both Rwanda and Burundi. Since 
independence Burundi has largely been controlled by the Tutsi minority which had full control over the army. In 
Rwanda, the Hutu were in control until the genocide in 1994, after which President Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, has 
led the country uninterruptedly (Uvin 1999; Rice 2010) 
 The cases of Rwanda and Burundi also 
point to another important parameter in determining the type of rebel objective, 
namely the geographic concentration of the groups. It is commonly taken for granted 
that for a secessionist conflict to erupt, the ethnic group in question must have a 
territorial ‘homeland’ that defines the scope of the secessionist claims (see e.g. 
Horowitz 1985). Lijphart (1977) refers to this as incongruence, which implies that a 
state is divided into relatively homogenous entities of geographically separated ethnic 
26 
 
groups. A pertinent example of this is India, where the borders of the 28 federal states 
are drawn largely along ethnic lines (Mathew 2005:167). 
In contrast, the Tutsi minorities in Rwanda and Burundi are quite evenly distributed 
around the territory of the two states (Uvin 1999). This congruence effectively 
precludes secessionism as a viable rebel objective, since there is simply no homeland 
to proclaim as independent. Incongruence can thus be seen as something close to a 
necessary precondition for secessionist conflicts to erupt, whereas in a congruent 
system the excluded and frustrated minorities would be forced to aim for government 
control.  
While the face validity of this argument is strong, testing it statistically would require 
data on the level of ethnic groups that to my knowledge is non-existent as of today. 
Some groundbreaking work has recently been done on the geo-referencing of ethnic 
groups (see Weidmann et.al. 2010), yet these datasets use geographic polygons as the 
unit of analysis, not the groups themselves. This might make it difficult to determine 
whether a group perceives of this polygon, within which it constitutes a majority, as a 
homeland. This is work in progress, and it may very well open up a set of new 
opportunities for testing. 
The question of incongruence is undoubtedly important in terms of complementing our 
understanding of rebel objectives, yet it might be less important for the classification 
of multiethnic states. Hence, it should suffice here to suggest that territorial conflicts 
are likely to be most prevalent in dominant systems, while government conflicts 
should be relatively more prevalent in balanced systems.  
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2.14 Four main hypotheses 
If we now attempt to summarize the theoretical constructs introduced so far, we can 
discern four main hypotheses. First, the lion’s share of the arguments over 
fragmentation seems to concur with the economic theory that initially made the ELF-
index popular; that more groups increases the risk of conflict. Both Mearsheimer 
(2001) and Sartori (1990) indicate that a country with extensive ethnic fragmentation 
is likely to be more prone to conflict than a country with low fragmentation. This is 
because the addition of more groups increases the actor complexity of the system, 
makes competition largely centrifugal, and raises the costs of coordination – which in 
turn augments the risk of some form of ethnic conflict. Moreover, on high levels of 
fragmentation the lack of a clear majority creates uncertainty in terms of actor motives, 
which in turn is likely to bring about elements of what Sambanis (2001:262) labels an 
“ethnic security dilemma”. The logical strategy for actors in such a situation is to 
resort to deterrence as the primary strategy of defense, and balance-of-power is likely 
to be the order of the day. And, as the structural realists contend, balance-of-power 
will be less stable if there are many actors in the system, simply because this increases 
the degree of uncertainty. 
On the other hand, increasing fragmentation should not be expected to have the same 
effect in all countries, regardless of the balance in the system. In dominant systems, 
where the largest group is in clear but not overwhelming majority, the effect of 
fragmentation would presumably be countered by the effect of dominance – 
understood here as the propensity of the majority to exclude and discriminate against 
one or more minorities. As Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest; the risk from 
dominance is likely to be highest in systems with only two groups, since, in absolute 
terms, this would maximize the degree to which the majority is able to discriminate 
while the minority is able to resist.  
Figure 2a provides a graphic overview of how majority control can be conceptualized 
to interact with minority capability. As the illustration shows, the expected control by 
the majority (majority control) is understood to decrease in proportion to the balance 
of the system, meaning that the more equal the two largest groups are in size (right 
28 
 
side), the less control the largest group will exercise over the minority, and the less 
inclined it will be to dominate. Conversely, the capability of the minority to resist this 
dominance (minority capability) runs in the opposite direction; the larger the minority, 
the greater the capability to resist exclusion by the majority. As the system approaches 
balance (i.e. the two largest groups are near equal in size), the majority control 
effectively disappears. At the other end of the spectrum, where majority control is at 
its highest, and minority capability is at its lowest (i.e. hegemony), the majority control 
is overwhelming, and what Collier & Hoeffler (2004) call ‘exploitative potential’ is 
reduced to a minimum.  
Both the left and the right edges of the model thus represent situations where the risk 
of conflict resulting from dominance should be limited (Mm = 0). Assuming that these 
two axes are symmetric and proportional, one could further imagine a point of 
intersection at which the control of the majority and the resistance capability of the 
minority intersect. This would then indicate the ratio between the majority and the 
largest minority at which the effect of dominance should be at its highest, and hence 
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the risk of conflict resulting from dominance. Given that the outer left perimeter of the 
model represents a near monopoly situation – where the largest group is close to 100 
percent and the second largest group close to 0 – and that the outer right perimeter 
represents a 50:50 balance, the point of intersection could hence be written as a 2:1 
equation: g2/g1=1/2. 
When there are many groups in the system, the exploitative potential of the majority is 
smaller since the control of the majority and the resistance capability of the largest 
minority is limited in absolute terms. In Figure 2b this is illustrated by reducing the 
size of the box that depicts the sum of the two largest groups compared to the rest of 
the population. This suggests that if the exploitative potential is highest on low levels 
of fragmentation, while the risk from uncertainty, security dilemmas and centrifugal 
competition is highest on high levels of fragmentation, these would effectively 
neutralize each other if the two forces are comparable in strength. The expected impact 
of fragmentation in dominant systems is therefore hard to predict. By contrast, in 
hegemonic and balanced systems, where the risk from dominance is lower, higher 
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levels of fragmentation should, in line with the arguments laid out above, increase the 
overall risk of ethnic conflict since there is no force that pulls the risk in the opposite 
direction.  
In addition to providing a qualified interpretation of the effect of fragmentation, the 
model in Figure 2a and 2b thus provide the basis for the second hypothesis, namely 
that dominant systems as such are likely to be more prone to conflict than either 
hegemonic or balanced systems. The basis for this argument resides partly in the above 
notions of the exploitative potential which is maximized in dominant systems 
(intersection point), and partly as a deduced implication of the arguments for 
hegemonic and balanced stability. Provided that Wohlforth (2006) and Mearsheimer 
(2001) are right in their assumptions regarding bipolar and hegemonic stability, and 
that their arguments can in effect be transposed onto the domestic domain, the most 
volatile ethnic constellation would be the unbalanced (i.e. dominant) systems.  
Third, there is reason to believe that some ethnic constellations will be more prone to a 
certain type of ethnic conflict. As noted above, the strategy chosen by an ‘anti-system 
group’ can be expected to depend on the opportunity and relative capability of the 
group, and if a given group has a chance of obtaining the ‘ultimate prize’ of control 
over the whole territory, one should expect it to aim for this objective. If, on the other 
hand, the rebel group is facing a clear majority, whose power and dominance 
effectively precludes strategies for taking control over the government then one should 
expect the rebel objective to be focused on autonomy or secession. If this assumption 
holds true, then balanced systems should be more prone to conflict over government 
while dominant systems should to be more prone to conflict over territory, which 
would be the fourth hypothesis. Hegemonic systems should also be associated with 
territorial conflict, but the reduced exploitative potential of hegemonic systems implies 
that the grievances and frustration, as well as the increased majority control, will limit 
the frequency of either type of war.  
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The four hypotheses can thus be summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Fragmentation increases the overall risk of ethnic conflict. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Dominance increases the overall risk of ethnic conflict. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The risk of territorial conflict is highest in dominant systems. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The risk of government conflict is highest in balanced systems. 
 
Figure 3 provides a graphic overview of the theoretical arguments that underpin the 
different hypotheses. 
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3 Operationalization 
In this chapter a set of different measures for testing the four hypotheses are 
discussed. Some are drawn from previous research (such as fractionalization and 
polarization) while others, notably a new fragmentation measure, are introduced as 
new alternative measures. The main focus is placed on the two first hypotheses, i.e. on 
fragmentation and dominance. 
 
In order to test the four hypotheses we need measures that, as accurately as possible, 
can capture the intended effects on both fragmentation and dominance. As for 
fragmentation, the measure should minimize the potential inconsistency resulting from 
individual coding rules of different ethnic conflict datasets. Secondly, the measure 
should aim to count only the relevant groups of the system. Third, the measure testing 
fragmentation should minimize the correlation with balance, in order to single out the 
effects of each. The same criterion logically applies to the dominance measure. In 
addition, the dominance measure should be adjustable so that different imbalance 
relations can be tested. While Collier & Hoeffler’s (2004) theoretical assumptions, as 
explained and elaborated in Figures 2a and 2b, suggest that the most conflict prone 
balance ratio is 2:1, it should also be possible to test other balance ratios, such as 3:1 
or 4:1. 
3.1 Fragmentation 
The most intuitive manner of measuring fragmentation would be to simply count the 
number of groups in each country, preferably guided by a set of rules for how groups 
should be included or discarded. The problem with using the plain number of groups is 
that countries with very high numbers of groups could disproportionately influence the 
results. To limit this effect, one could calculate the natural logarithm of the number of 
groups instead, thereby reducing the marginal effect of additional groups at high levels 
of fragmentation. This would be in line with Sartori’s (1990) reasoning regarding 
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atomized systems, in which the addition of another group no longer alters the overall 
dynamics of the system.  
In order to test the alternative hypothesis – namely that fragmentation reduces the risk 
of conflict – one could also adopt the measure used by Deutsch & Singer (1964) for 
calculating the number of interaction opportunities. The measure is written in the 
following form 
IO =  
where N is the number of groups in the system (Deutsch & Singer 1964:393). Figures 
4a and 4b show the relationship between these three varities of measures, using the 
number of groups as the base. Figure 4a displays the interaction opportunities, while 
Figure 4b the natural logarithm of groups compared to the actual number of groups. 
Note that interaction opportunities are hypothesized to reduce the risk of conflict, not 
increase it. 
 
A fourth way of measuring fragmentation could be to calculate the share of the two 
largest groups in relation to the rest of the population. This could be written simply as 
F= 1-g1-g2 
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where g1 is the largest groups’ share of the total population, and g2 is the share of the 
second largest group. Hence, if the two largest groups together make up nearly 100 
percent of the total population, fragmentation would be low. Conversely, if the share 
of the two largest groups constitutes only a small share of the total, then fragmentation 
would be high since the remaining share would necessarily have to be split into entities 
smaller than the two largest groups.  
The advantage of such an approach is that it is relatively insensitive to the individual 
coding of all the groups, and it would thus allow for easier robustness testing across 
different datasets of ethnic groups. Moreover, it effectively sidesteps the question of 
which groups to consider as relevant. It simply suggests that if the share of the two 
largest groups is small, then fragmentation must necessarily be high. The reason for 
not using only the largest group is that the largest group alone will be highly correlated 
with the balance of the system.5
Another drawback of such a measure of fragmentation is that it does not capture the 
nuances of the distribution beyond the second largest group. A country with a 
(50,25,25) distribution would obtain the same score on the fragmentation measure as a 
country with a (50,25,1,1,..1) distribution. Theoretically, this difference could alter the 
ability of the minorities to unite in opposition against the majority, a property that 
would be concealed in this fragmentation measure. On the other hand it also shows 
how the alternative – the mere counting of groups – might say even less about the 
dynamics of the system, since it does not take into account the actual size of any of the 
groups. 
 This could, of course be controlled for, but lower 
correlation between the two dimensions (fragmentation or balance) makes it easier to 
determine which of the two that has the highest impact on conflict risk. In order to 
focus the measure on fragmentation, it therefore makes sense to include the two largest 
groups instead. This does not eliminate the problem, since there will still be a certain 
amount of correlation between balance and fragmentation, especially on very low 
levels of the former, yet the effect should be mitigated.  
                                              
5 Fearon & Laitin (2003) find that the size of the largest group has no significant effect on the onset of civil war, 
neither ethnic nor non-ethnic. 
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The measures that do take the size of all the groups into account are fractionalization 
and polarization, as introduced above. The main drawback with these measures is that 
they capture both the number of groups and balance at the same time. Nevertheless, 
both measures can be expected to give an indication of whether the risk of ethnic 
conflict is highest in systems with few groups or with many groups, and thus provide 
some clue as to the validity of the hypothesis.  
In line with previous research (see e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Ellingsen 2000; 
Sambanis 2001; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Buhaug 2006) the measure for 
fractionalization can be calculated using a version of the Herfindahl index. It can be 
written in the following form 
 
where g represents group i’s share of the total population, and N the number of groups 
in the system. The measure ranges from 0 to 1 and approaches 1 when all groups are 
equal in size and the number of groups nears infinity. As such, one should expect the 
fractionalization measure to be closely correlated with the fragmentation measure, 
since both react to increasing number of groups. The main difference is that 
fractionalization is sensitive to the balance between the two largest groups. In a 
country of only two groups, where the largest is 99 percent and the second is 1 percent 
of the population, both measures will return values close to 0. But if the two groups are 
closer to 50 percent each, then fractionalization would increase towards .5, while 
fragmentation remains close to zero. This implies that for the medium levels of 
fractionalization, the corresponding score on the fragmentation index would generally 
be lower. On very high levels of fractionalization, the two measures will converge 
again. 
The polarization measure was not originally constructed to capture fragmentation as 
such. On the contrary, it captures the lack of it, since it is maximized when there are 
only two relevant groups. But precisely for that reason it can also serve it test whether 
fragmentation has any effect on ethnic conflict, since it would yield a negative 
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coefficient if Hypothesis 1 is correct. The measure can be calculated using a simplified 
version of Esteban & Ray’s (1994) measure, as employed by Reynal-Querol (2002). It 
is written in the following form 
 
The measure thus calculated is set to maximize on a scale from 0 to 1 when two 
groups constitute 50 percent each (50,0,0,..50). Moreover, it exponentially favors large 
groups over small ones, something which makes sense given the fact that the 
mechanism of bipolar antagonism (as discussed above) is most likely to take effect on 
high levels of polarization. Figure 5 compares fractionalization and polarization for 
fully balanced systems (g1=g2=g3=…gN) with an increasing number of groups. 
 
In total, this leaves us with a range of six different measures that all can be used in 
different degrees to test the effect of fragmentation on the risk of ethnic conflict: 
1. The number of groups: Groups 
2. The natural logarithm of the number of groups: Ln(Groups) 
3. The interaction opportunities between the groups: Interaction Opportunities 
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4. The share of the population not belonging to either of the two largest groups: 
Fragmentation 
5. The chance that two randomly selected individuals belong to different groups: 
Fractionalization 
6. The extent to which the country is split into two equally sized groups: 
Polarization 
 
Of these six measures, the fourth (fragmentation) is the one that best meets the criteria 
introduced above: It minimizes the potential inconsistency resulting from individual 
coding rules of different ethnic conflict datasets, and it ensures that only relevant 
groups are counted (since it only takes the size of the two largest groups into account) 
while minimizing the correlation with the balance dimension. All the six measures are 
still included in the subsequent regressions in order to test their respective 
performances. 
3.2 Balance and Dominance 
Testing this hypothesis first requires a measure for calculating the balance of the 
system. The most straightforward manner of doing this is to use the ratio between the 
largest and the second largest group in the system, written as 
 
where g1 is the largest and g2 the second largest group. This yields a linear index which 
is maximized when the two largest groups are equal in size (g2/g1=.5/.5), and 
minimized when the largest group approaches 100 percent of the population 
(g2/g1=0/1). This could in turn form the basis for a binary measure for dominance by 
placing countries into three classes of systems; hegemonic, dominant and balanced. 
The dominant class could theoretically be understood to comprise the center half of the 
balance spectrum. If the intersection point introduced in Figure 2 represents the 
maximum conflict risk, and if each end of the spectrum represents minimum risk, then 
the thresholds could be set half way towards either end of the scale (B=.25 and 
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B=.75). This implies that systems in which the second largest group constitutes less 
than 25 percent of the largest group would be classified as hegemonic. Conversely, all 
systems in which the same ratio is above 75 percent would be classified as balanced. 
All those in between would be classified as dominant. A crude manner of testing the 
hypothesis could thus be to use a dummy that codes dominant systems as 1, and 
hegemonic and balanced systems as 0. Yet, this would not remedy the shortcomings of 
the binary measure for dominance used by Collier & Hoeffler (2004), where a country 
is coded as dominant if the largest group constitutes between 45 and 90 percent of the 
population. If the aim is to identify the ratio between the largest and second largest 
group at which the risk of conflict is at its highest, then a more sophisticated approach 
is required.  
Such a measure can be developed by enabling the above balance measure to be 
adjusted for different ‘peak points’. This could be done by introducing a parameter (c) 
that indicates the balance value at which the measure will be maximized on a scale 
from 0 to 1. When B=c, the measure should thus yield 1. To ensure symmetry in the 
measure, the difference between balance and c could be squared. This also makes the 
curve parabolic, which corresponds well with the theoretical notion that the most 
volatile balance ratio is not at the ‘peak point’ but around it (c.f. Horowitz 1985, 
Sartori 1990). The measure could be written in the following form 
 
Figure 6a shows how the balance ratio at which the conflict risk is assumed to be at its 
highest changes with different values of c. The drawback of this equation is that it does 
not utilize the whole spectrum from 0 to 1, and that different values of c span different 
parts of the spectrum. When c=.5, the minimum obtainable value for D* is .75, while 
the minimum value for c=.7 and c=.3 is .5. Adjusting this requires a dividend that 
changes with different values of c. It could be devised by taking c=.5 as the base 
value, adding the distance from this base (.5) to c, and squaring the sum. This ensures 
that the dividend is minimized at c=.5 while gradually increasing on higher and lower 
values of c. The D* measure could thus be extended and written as follows 
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With c=.7, the dividend becomes (|.7-.5|+.5)2 = (.2+.5)2 = .49. With c=.3 the 
dividend is the same and with c=.5 it returns (|.5-.5|+.5)2 = (0+.5)2 = .25. This ensures 
that each value of c returns dominance values between 0 and 1, and it effectively 
allows for the identification of the hypothesized peak point of ethnic conflict risk 
empirically. Figure 6b illustrates how the measure now changes with different values 
of c. 
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In order to distinguish this measure of dominance from the binary measure employed 
by Collier & Hoeffler (2004), the latter is henceforth referred to as dominanceCH. The 
reason for not using a different term to describe this measure is that the theoretical 
construct upon which it is built is drawn largely from Collier and Hoeffler. For 
clarification, I should perhaps also repeat that fragmentation and balance represent the 
two main dimensions of the heterogeneity landscape. Each of these now have a 
measure explicitly aimed at placing countries along these two dimensions – 
fragmentation and balance. The measures are consitently written in italics in order to 
distinguish them from the dimensions. The dominance measure also aims at the 
balance dimension, yet it attempts to identify a nonlinear pattern and thus identify the 
value of balance at which the risk of conflict is highest. 
Since the effect of dominance is assumed to be at its highest on low levels of 
fragmentation (c.f. Figure 2b), one could devise an additional test that only includes 
countries with low values of fragmentation. The idea would be to test the effect of 
dominance where it is theoretically thought to be at its highest, triggered by the cases 
such as Sri Lanka and Rwanda. If this test returns insignificant results, the notion that 
dominance may be most relevant on low levels of fragmentation should be discarded. 
The interaction between dominance and fragmentation could also be checked by 
multiplying the two measures and include this as a separate variable. 
3.3 Government and Territory 
The theoretical argument that underpins Hypothesis 3 is linked to notion of relative 
rebel capability, as discussed above. It is further coupled with the concept of 
exploitative potential, which suggests that the risk of conflict would be highest when 
the largest group is double the size of the second largest group (B=.5).This because 
B=.5 is the center-point between absolute majority control and absolute parity, as 
derived from Collier & Hoeffler’s (2004) notion of ‘clear but not overwhelming 
majority’ and explained in Figure 2. In combination this indicates that the risk of 
territorial conflict will be highest in dominant systems since the relative capability of 
the minority will be large enough to contemplate armed resistance, but not large 
enough to aim for full control of the state. An underlying assumption for this 
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hypothesis is that the conflict will be started by rebels, and not by the majority. This is, 
of course, not always the case, but it nevertheless remains a viable assumption. 
The test of whether this hypothesis holds true could be done in the same manner as for 
H2, but with the difference that it singles out only territorial conflicts on the dependent 
variable. Fragmentation should also be added to these regressions, in order to test the 
assumption that fragmentation is less relevant for territorial conflicts. 
The theoretical foundation for Hypothesis 4 rests on the dual notions of relative rebel 
capability and the presumed effects of fragmentation. If rebel capability increases in 
proportion to the size of the group in question, then the risk of government conflict 
should be at its highest in balanced systems, since the discrepancy between majority 
and minority would be at its lowest. In addition, the general arguments for increased 
risk from fragmentation indicate that the risk of government conflict should be at its 
highest in balanced systems with high fragmentation. 
This could be tested by simply employing the linear measure of balance alongside a 
measure that tests fragmentation. These could also be combined into a new variable to 
see how they interact. As for H3 one could also use a simple dummy variable to check 
whether balanced systems indeed have a higher risk of government conflict. These 
tests would, of course, have to be conducted on a dependent variable that only includes 
government conflict onsets. H3 and H4 should also be tested together in a binominal 
regression that captures the possible interaction between the two types of conflict, and 
the effect each of the explanatory variables have on the outcome. 
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4 Methodological Issues 
In this chapter some of the methodological issues related to the statistical study of 
ethnic conflict are discussed. The chapter 2s divided into two main parts; input 
problems and output problems. The first mainly concerns issues related to the coding 
and interpretation of ethnicity, while the latter focuses on matters related to the coding 
of the dependent variable. The chapter concludes by pointing to the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset and the corresponding dataset of ethnic conflicts (both by Wimmer 
et.al. 2009) as the best available sources for statistical testing of the relationship 
between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. 
4.1 Input 
I mentioned earlier that the ELF-index has been criticized for its lack of theoretical 
underpinnings. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 aimed, to some extent, to 
remedy this shortcoming by placing the link between fractionalization and conflict into 
a broader theoretical framework of IR and political science theory. Yet, this theoretical 
weakness represents only part of the criticism directed at the ELF-index. 
Drawing on constructivist theory Laitin & Posner (2001) point to four fundamental 
challenges to the ELF index that all revolve around the exercise of counting and 
coding ethnic groups. First they contend that by using ethnic data from the early ‘60s 
to explain the outbreak of conflict over a period of half a century, statisticians make 
the cardinal error of viewing ethnicity as a fixed property that does not change over 
time. Laitin & Posner (2001:4) liken this to an economist who uses the rate of inflation 
in 1945 to measure a country’s economic prosperity in 1990. While this analogy might 
be deemed an exaggeration, most sociologists and anthropologists would insist that 
ethnicity is a fluid concept; multilayered and multifaceted, contextual and largely 
negotiable (see Eriksen 1993; Jenkins 1997). 
Using the example of Somalia, Laitin & Posner (2001) show how the relevance of the 
different ethnic or tribal cleavages can change over time. When the Atlas Narodov 
Mira (ANM) was compiled, Somalia was considered one of the most ethnically 
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homogenous countries in the world, yet towards the end of the cold war and the fall of 
Siyaad Barre, the country became “severely divided by inter-clan fractionalization” 
(Laitin & Posner 2001:2). Hence, if the ethnic configuration of a country is to serve as 
a viable explanatory variable, data on ethnic groups will need to be coded in time-
series, similar to variables such as GDP and population. 
Laitin & Posner’s (2001) second criticism regards the one-dimensional interpretation 
of ethnicity used in the ANM dataset. Provided an understanding of ethnicity as a fluid 
and contextual concept, one cannot a priori adopt a single criterion for ethnic 
divisions. In some societies ethnic groups will be defined by religious cleavages, in 
others it could be linguistic, cultural or even pigmental (as in much of Latin America). 
Quite often a country would even be divided by multiple types of cleavages at the 
same time. Iraq constitutes such a case, with the Kurds separated from the rest of the 
country by a linguistic and cultural cleavage, while the Shiite and Sunni in the south 
are divided along a confessional cleavage. In the ANM, these latter groups are lumped 
together simply as ‘Iraq Arabs’, since the dataset does not include confessional 
parameters. There is no simple remedy for this problem, besides coding a country’s 
ethnic groups according to the most relevant cleavages, regardless of the nature of 
these cleavages.6
The question of relevance points to a third criticism of the ELF-index. As Laitin & 
Posner (2001:3) note, “once we have established which dimension of ethnic cleavage 
is salient, we still need to decide which groups we should include in our count”. This 
idea rests on the assumption that not all groups are equally relevant politically, and 
those that are deemed irrelevant should be excluded from the statistical measures that 
aim to explain political outcomes such as armed violence and civil wars. As such, the 
challenge is analogous to the exercise of counting relevant political parties in order to 
classify party systems, a question that has received considerable attention from 
political scientists. Sartori (1990) suggests that a general rule for deciding whether a 
 
                                              
6 There is good reason to believe that some types of ethnic cleavages are more conflict prone than others. 
Pigmental cleavages, it could be argued, are less ‘dangerous’ than linguistic ones, but testing this would require 
data on group level that as of today is not available. 
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party is relevant is to assess whether it has coalition potential, that is, whether it over 
time has been considered by the other parties to be a potential coalition partner. A 
similar criterion could be applied for ethnic groups, though with certain practical 
adjustments. The inherent challenge in such an approach to coding is that one risks 
excluding large parts of the populations from the dataset. I return to this below. 
The fourth criticism advanced by Laitin & Posner (2001:4) concerns the potential 
problems of endogeneity involved in the coding of ethnic groups. Quite often the 
relevance of ethnic cleavages is the effect of political change, not the cause, which 
would have the “causal arrows going the wrong direction”. That said, one could argue 
that the potential problems of endogeneity are even more prevalent when ethnic groups 
are coded according to relevance, in the manner proposed by Laitin & Posner. If ethnic 
groups are to be counted according to the effect these groups can be expected to have 
on the outcome variable, then the risk of defining the independent variable by means 
of the dependent variable is compelling. Posner (2004:856) recognizes this dilemma, 
but insists that as long as the criterion for relevance is reasonably decoupled from the 
concepts measured on the outcome variable this should not cause systematic 
measurement errors. In any case, he contends, the implications of using an index “that 
captures a constellation of ethnic groups that is in some cases completely unrelated to 
the process whose effects are being investigated” would be even worse (ibid.). In other 
words, counting groups by relevance is perceived as the least bad option. 
There is an alternative approach to this dilemma that could strike a balance between 
the question of relevance and endogeneity. The fragmentation measure escapes some 
of this criticism since it disregards completely the configuration of the remaining share 
of the population. Small groups would thus be counted only as far as they contribute to 
this ‘residual share’. The drawback is of course that the nuances of highly fragmented 
societies are lost, yet if a balance needs to be struck between relevance and 
endogeneity such a measure of fragmentation might be the most viable manner of 
doing it. 
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In recognizing the shortcomings of the ANM – in particular its age and vestigiality – 
some scholars have turned to others sources of ethnic groups. Alesina et.al. (2003) use 
data from Encyclopedia Britannica (EB), Fearon & Laitin (2003) resort, among other 
things, to the CIA Factbook, while Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005) rely 
mainly on the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE). Despite the application of certain 
counting rules for relevance, these datasets fall far short of meeting the criticism 
advanced by Laitin & Posner above. The WCE, for one, fails to distinguish between 
different Muslim denominations and effectively lumps together the Shiite and the 
Sunni in Iraq in one large category labeled ‘Iraqi Arab’. 
In an attempt to improve on these shortcomings, Posner (2004) develops a dataset of 
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG), and, despite the abovementioned 
problems of endogeneity, this goes a long way in improving the validity of the ethnic 
source material. The main limitation of this dataset is that it covers only Africa. 
Recently a more comprehensive project has been undertaken by Wimmer, Cederman 
& Min (2009) in a project entitled Ethnic Power Relations (EPR). With the aid of 
nearly 100 different country experts, they code politically relevant ethnic groups in a 
total of 155 countries for the period from 1946 to 2005. Of these, 128 countries are 
considered multiethnic, the rest are classified as ethnically homogenous, i.e. having 
only one relevant ethnic group. By coding the relevant groups as they change over a 
period of nearly 60 years, this allows for testing the effect of changes in ethnic 
configurations over time. In order to minimize problems of endogeneity they also 
make sure that “the coding of ethnic power relations reflects the power constellations 
before the outbreak of conflict in cases where political changes occurred in the same 
year as a conflict” (Wimmer et.al. 2009:326). 
The main problem with the EPR dataset pertains to the abovementioned problem of 
exclusion. For certain countries in the dataset, such as Liberia, the total number of 
relevant groups cover only a small share of the population. Hence, if countries are 
classified according to the number of relevant ethnic groups, there is no way of 
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knowing how large the ‘shadow population’ is in each country - meaning the share of 
the population not included in the relevant groups.  
4.2 Output 
The second main category of methodological problems concerns the output phase of 
the statistical testing, and more specifically the question of how to code the dependent 
variable. Nicholas Sambanis (2001:259) notes that “as we undertake further study of 
the causes of civil war, it is important to know if our conclusions apply equally to wars 
of different types”. First of all, one should not expect the ethnic heterogeneity to 
explain the onset of non-ethnic conflicts. Hence, it makes little sense to include all 
civil war onsets in the dependent variable. The challenge is, of course, that it is often 
hard to say what constitutes an ‘ethnic’ civil war. Fearon & Laitin (2003:79) code 
conflicts as ethnic when the fighters were “mobilized primarily along ethnic lines”, 
and find that about 50 percent of the civil wars in their dataset were ethnic in nature, 
while about 20 percent were non-ethnic conflicts. The remaining conflicts were coded 
as ambiguous. 
Wimmer et.al (2009) find a similar distribution in their recently constructed dataset. 
They define conflicts as ethnic if the identified aim of one or more of the fighting 
factions is to achieve either “ethnonational self-determination, a more favorable ethnic 
balance-of-power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, the end of ethnic and racial 
discrimination, language [or] other cultural rights” (2009:326). Drawing on the 
PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et.al 2002) they identify a total of 
215 internal armed conflicts in the period from 1945 to 2005, of which 110 where 
coded as ethnic (Wimmer et.al 2009:327) and the rest as non-ethnic. 
Secondly, not all ethnic conflicts have the same aim. Territorial conflicts are likely to 
be triggered by somewhat different causes and mechanism than conflicts over 
government. Testing this evidently requires a dataset that distinguishes between the 
types of ethnic conflict. Crucially, Wimmer et al (2009) includes such a distinction in 
their dataset. In line with the above discussion on disaggregation, this allows for the 
testing of some ethnic configurations are particularly prone to one to of ethnic conflict. 
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The sum of these attributes makes the EPR dataset on ethnic groups and the 
corresponding dataset on conflicts, both compiled by Wimmer et.al (2009), the most 
suitable basis for testing the four main hypotheses of this paper. In the subsequent 
regression analyses, the EPR dataset is therefore used as the main source of data, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
  
48 
 
5 Testing & Results 
This chapter starts with an overview of the different variables employed to test the four 
main hypotheses, including the control variables. I then go on to test the four 
hypotheses, using logistic regression models. Hypothesis 3 and 4 are tested together, 
first in separate models and then binominally. After a slight detour on the topic of 
anocracy, some preliminary conclusions from the test are drawn. I then move on to 
test the robustness of the results across different datasets for both conflicts and ethnic 
groups. The results are also discussed in terms of probabilities, before the chapter 
ends with an outline of a classification for multiethnic states. 
 
The tests are conducted using standard logistic regression models in Stata.7
5.1 The main ethnic variables 
 In some of 
the tests binominal regression models are also employed in order to capture the 
interaction between the two types of ethnic conflicts (territory and government).  
To test Hypothesis 1, the six different measures expected to give an indication of 
system fragmentation are employed; namely the number of groups, the natural 
logarithm (ln) of groups, the interaction opportunities, fragmentation, 
fractionalization and polarization. All are calculated on the basis of the EPR dataset 
(Wimmer et.al 2009). As mentioned, the dataset contains annual data for the years 
1946 to 2005 for a total of 155 countries, of which 27 are coded as ethnically 
homogenous. These are dropped in the regressions since the aim of these tests is to 
identify patterns among ethnically heterogeneous countries, not to test the relationship 
between multiethnic and monoethnic countries as such.  
These variables are all regressed onto a binary dependent variable coded as 1 in the 
first year of an ethnic civil war and 0 in years without war. This is drawn directly from 
Wimmer et.al (2009). Ongoing war-years are coded as missing in order to omit wars 
                                              
7 Stata 10. See do-files with replication data in Appendix 1. 
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that start while the first war is still ongoing. Wimmer et.al. (2009:328) find that this 
reduces the number of observations by about 15 percent, but that it yields almost 
exactly the same results as when all years are included and ongoing war years added as 
a separate dummy. 
Hypothesis 2 is tested with the basic linear balance measure as well as a set of 
different versions of the dominance measure. Collier & Hoeffler’s (2001) dominance 
variable (dominanceCH) is also added for comparison, and so is a new binary 
dominancet=1 variable coded 1 if balance is between .25 and .75. If the ratio between 
the two largest groups does indeed affect the risk of conflict, then this should be 
captured by at least one of these measures. 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using the best measures for fragmentation and dominance 
respectively, regressed onto a dependent variable that only captures territorial ethnic 
conflicts. For Hypothesis 4, the standard balance measure is used in combination with 
a measure of fragmentation. The dependent variable for these latter tests covers only 
government conflicts. The interaction between these types of conflict is also tested by 
means of binominal regression models. 
5.2 Control variables 
Using data from Wimmer et.al (2009) I also include a set of control variables that 
cover the most salient determinants of civil war, such as population size, GDP per 
capita, and form of government.  Wimmer et.al (2009) use GDP data compiled from 
the Penn World Table and the World Bank, supplemented with data from Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). The numbers are in constant 2000 US dollars. Both population and GDP 
per capita are lagged in order to limit endogeneity problems.  
Wimmer et.al. (2009) also use a dummy for anocracy which aims to capture the non-
monotonic relationship between democracy and domestic conflict – that is, the 
tendency of both democracies and autocracies to be relatively stable compared to 
countries in between (see Muller & Weede 1990; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et.al. 2001; 
Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002; Mansfield & Snyder 2005; Hegre & Sambanis 
2006). Based on Polity IV data, the threshold for coding anocracy as 1 is set at -5 and 
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+5. Countries with higher or lower scores on the democracy index are coded as 0. A 
variable for political instability is also added, coded as 1 if there has been a change of 
more than 3 points on the Polity score in the last 3 years. 
There has further been a debate over whether or not the availability and ‘lootability’ of 
natural resources affects the risk of a either territorial or government conflict (see e.g. 
Ross 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Buhaug 2006). To control for this, an oil 
production per capita variable is included, based on data from Wimmer & Min (2006). 
Wimmer et.al. (2009) also control for mountainous terrain, which has been 
hypothesized to impact the ability of rebels to escape and hide (see e.g. Fearon & 
Laitin 2003). Finally, the number of years since last war is also controlled for with a 
peace years variable. The idea of the latter is that conflict breeds conflict and stability 
reinforces stability. All control variables are drawn directly from the EPR Ethnic 
Armed Conflict dataset (Wimmer et.al 2009). 
5.3 Testing hypothesis 1: the effect of fragmentation 
In Table 1, the six variables aimed at measuring fragmentation in different forms are 
tested separately. The same dataset is used for all the models. The first five are 
positive, and three of them are also significant on a 0,1 percent level or better. Groups 
and ln(groups) seem to yield the best results in terms of significance, while the 
fragmentation variable is the only one that remains significant at below 5 percent 
when all measure are included in the same model (1.1). Fractionalization is also 
positive, and close to 5 percent significance, while polarization is negative but weak. 
All the models in Table 1 thus seem to point in the same direction and towards general 
support for Hypothesis 1; that the risk of ethnic conflict is higher in countries with 
many ethnic groups.  
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In terms of overall explanatory power the race appears tied between model 1.3 and 1.5, 
both of which yield a log-likelihood of -352,6.  This suggests that fragmentation and 
ln(groups) are equally good at measuring the effect of increasing numbers of groups 
on the risk of ethnic conflict. However, the correlation between the two measures is 
limited to .48, suggesting that there are considerable discrepancies between what the 
two measures capture. Part of this could be attributed to the fact that the EPR dataset 
includes only relevant groups, effectively excluding parts of the population from the 
equation. The extreme case of this is Liberia, as mentioned above, where the five listed 
groups together constitute only 24 percent of the population.8
                                              
8 For the year 2000 the EPR dataset lists the following relevant groups in Liberia: Gio (8%), Mano (7%), 
Krahn/Guere (5%), Americo-Liberians (2%), Mandingo (1,7%) 
 In other words, a 
whopping 76 percent of the population remains unaccounted for. It could of course be 
the case that three quarter of the population should in fact considered non-ethnic or 
 
TABLE 1: Logistic regressions on ethnic conflict onsets: Fragmentation 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3)  (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) 
Groups 0.0704 
(0.132) 
0.0301*** 
(0.00884) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln(Groups) 0.715 
(0.734) 
 
 
0.692*** 
(0.156) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Opportunities -0.00288 
(0.00347) 
 
 
 
 
0.000662 
(0.000357) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragmentation 2.958* 
(1.296) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.203** 
(0.677) 
 
 
 
 
Fractionalization -2.759 
(1.688) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.249 
(0.690) 
 
 
Polarization 1.611 
(1.310) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.559 
(0.690) 
Peace years 0.00713 
(0.00998) 
0.00300 
(0.00996) 
0.00383 
(0.0101) 
0.00322 
(0.00986) 
0.00568 
(0.00975) 
0.00339 
(0.00992) 
0.00382 
(0.00970) 
GDP per capita lag -0.0976* 
(0.0424) 
-0.143** 
(0.0477) 
-0.122** 
(0.0441) 
-0.150** 
(0.0493) 
-0.104* 
(0.0439) 
-0.124* 
(0.0502) 
-0.156** 
(0.0519) 
Ln(Population) lag 0.0831 
(0.100) 
0.168 
(0.109) 
0.0861 
(0.102) 
0.231* 
(0.108) 
0.238* 
(0.0975) 
0.256** 
(0.0929) 
0.293** 
(0.0971) 
Oil production pc 0.731** 
(0.280) 
0.840** 
(0.288) 
0.809** 
(0.277) 
0.817** 
(0.288) 
0.748** 
(0.259) 
0.748** 
(0.265) 
0.801** 
(0.269) 
Anocracy t=1 0.0213 
(0.0195) 
0.0411* 
(0.0190) 
0.0350* 
(0.0173) 
0.0440* 
(0.0193) 
0.0223 
(0.0213) 
0.0353 
(0.0191) 
0.0471* 
(0.0190) 
Political instability 0.303 
(0.291) 
0.268 
(0.294) 
0.278 
(0.296) 
0.245 
(0.293) 
0.268 
(0.295) 
0.213 
(0.289) 
0.226 
(0.288) 
Ln(Mountains) -0.0180 
(0.109) 
-0.0632 
(0.102) 
-0.0601 
(0.104) 
-0.0581 
(0.102) 
0.00843 
(0.106) 
-0.0444 
(0.103) 
-0.0380 
(0.101) 
Constant -6.730*** 
(1.225) 
-5.684*** 
(1.046) 
-5.825*** 
(0.955) 
-6.104*** 
(1.055) 
-7.013*** 
(0.975) 
-6.945*** 
(1.089) 
-6.374*** 
(1.140) 
Observations 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.064 0.077 0.060 0.077 0.064 0.059 
AIC 722.9 732.7 723.2 736.1 723.1 733.1 736.7 
Log-likelihood -347.5 -357.3 -352.6 -359.0 -352.6 -357.5 -359.3 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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belonging to ethnically irrelevant groups. It seems more likely, however, that this 
amounts to either a coding error or to a problem with the coding rules.  
The discrepancy between the measures also points to the fact that the number of 
relevant groups may vary even if the size of the two largest groups stays constant. 
When compared in the same model, it appears the fragmentation measure is in fact the 
most significant of them, and consequently that the size of the two largest groups is in 
fact a better indicator of the risk of conflict than the natural logarithm of the number of 
relevant groups. Fragmentation is therefore used to test the effect of group numbers in 
the subsequent regressions. 
In terms of the control variables, GDP per capita yields a consistent, negative effect 
on conflict risk, while population is consistently positive. In model 1.2 and 1.3 the 
effect of population seems to be taken over by the group variables (groups and 
ln(groups)), which could be explained by the fact that for high levels of groups and 
population, the two are likely to correlate closely. Anocracy is significant for most of 
the models, but only at a 5 percent level. Finally, peaceyears, political instability and 
ln(mountains) remain insignificant throughout. 
5.4 Testing hypothesis 2: the effect of dominance 
Table 2 presents the results from adding measures of balance and dominance to model 
1.5. The results are less conclusive than those of Table 1. In general, the balance 
dimension seems to have little if any effect on the risk of conflict, whether it is tested 
with the basic balance measure or with different versions of dominance. The best log-
likelihood is obtained in model 2.2 and 2.3 (-351.1), where dominance is calculated 
with c=.4 and c=.5, though these models are only marginally better at explaining 
ethnic conflict onsets than when the balance measures were excluded altogether. In 
model 2.7 the product of fragmentation and dominancec=.5 is added as a separate 
variable in order to test the interaction between the two variables. This does not 
improve the log-likelihood, suggesting that there is no interaction to speak of between 
dominance and fragmentation. This indicates that the effect of fragmentation should be 
similar at all levels of balance, hence contradicting the theoretical notion that 
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fragmentation should have the highest impact on low levels of dominance (c.f. 
discussion in Chapter 2). 
Similarly, in model 2.8 countries with three groups or more are omitted from the 
regression in order to test the marginal effect of dominance at the point where it is 
hypothesized to have the highest effect. This limits the number of observations to 
1565. Not only does this return an insignificant coefficient; it even appears the 
direction of it has shifted. Hence, insofar as the ratio between the largest and second 
largest group has any significant effect on the risk of conflict it does not show up when 
tested on an aggregate level of ethnic conflict. Whether the effect is any stronger when 
 
TABLE 2: Logistic regressions on ethnic conflict onsets: Balance & Dominance 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) 
Fragmentation 2.216** 
(0.736) 
2.236** 
(0.693) 
1.939** 
(0.708) 
1.913** 
(0.724) 
2.173** 
(0.661) 
2.844*** 
(0.822) 
1.751 
(1.321) 
 
 
Balance g2/g1 -0.0240 
(0.455) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominance c=.4  
 
0.962 
(0.659) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominance c=.5  
 
 
 
0.681 
(0.462) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.599 
(0.658) 
-0.0522 
(1.158) 
Dominance c=.6  
 
 
 
 
 
0.501 
(0.462) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominance t=1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0648 
(0.347) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CH dominance t=1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.437 
(0.368) 
 
 
 
 
Fragm*Balancec=.5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.292 
(1.926) 
 
 
Peace years 0.00570 
(0.00975) 
0.00627 
(0.00975) 
0.00590 
(0.00979) 
0.00552 
(0.00980) 
0.00575 
(0.00966) 
0.00748 
(0.0101) 
0.00578 
(0.0101) 
0.0329 
(0.0194) 
GDP per capita lag -0.104* 
(0.0437) 
-0.101* 
(0.0418) 
-0.0990* 
(0.0422) 
-0.1000* 
(0.0432) 
-0.104* 
(0.0440) 
-0.106* 
(0.0435) 
-0.0988* 
(0.0422) 
-0.421* 
(0.186) 
Ln(Population) lag 0.237* 
(0.0972) 
0.238* 
(0.101) 
0.250* 
(0.0991) 
0.251** 
(0.0970) 
0.240* 
(0.0988) 
0.202 
(0.105) 
0.252* 
(0.0993) 
-0.000412 
(0.224) 
Oil production pc 0.0224 
(0.0211) 
0.0214 
(0.0203) 
0.0194 
(0.0216) 
0.0197 
(0.0220) 
0.0222 
(0.0213) 
0.0221 
(0.0213) 
0.0194 
(0.0216) 
0.488** 
(0.189) 
Anocracy t=1 0.750** 
(0.265) 
0.768** 
(0.258) 
0.730** 
(0.261) 
0.718** 
(0.266) 
0.749** 
(0.259) 
0.771** 
(0.263) 
0.732** 
(0.261) 
1.200 
(0.718) 
Political instability 0.269 
(0.294) 
0.259 
(0.294) 
0.248 
(0.289) 
0.252 
(0.289) 
0.267 
(0.294) 
0.286 
(0.298) 
0.247 
(0.289) 
0.0548 
(0.727) 
Ln(Mountains) 0.00828 
(0.106) 
0.0326 
(0.109) 
0.0376 
(0.109) 
0.0250 
(0.107) 
0.0125 
(0.112) 
0.00197 
(0.108) 
0.0402 
(0.113) 
-0.0131 
(0.263) 
Constant -7.001*** 
(0.978) 
-7.823*** 
(1.235) 
-7.551*** 
(1.095) 
-7.416*** 
(1.054) 
-7.054*** 
(1.012) 
-7.069*** 
(1.004) 
-7.523*** 
(1.101) 
-4.393* 
(1.962) 
Observations 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 5059 1565 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.080 0.081 0.079 0.077 0.079 0.081 0.103 
AIC 725.1 722.3 722.2 723.7 725.1 723.6 724.2 161.5 
Log-likelihood -352.6 -351.1 -351.1 -351.8 -352.5 -351.8 -351.1 -71.74 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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the dependent variable is disaggregated by actor aim (territory and government) should 
become clear in Table 3, where the dependent variable is split into the two types of 
conflict. 
5.5 Testing Hypotheses 3 & 4: Disaggregating the DV 
In Table 3 the first two models are regressed onto binary variables for territorial and 
government conflicts respectively. The dataset is the same as in the previous tests 
(Wimmer et.al 2009) in which ethnic conflicts are also coded as either territorial or 
governmental. As in the previous tests, ongoing war years are coded as missing. In 
terms of ethnic variables, fragmentation is used in all models, while dominance is used 
for conflicts over territory and balance is used for conflicts over government. This 
corresponds to the last two hypotheses which suggest that territorial conflict should be 
most prevalent on high levels of dominance (H3), while the government conflicts 
should be most prevalent on high levels of balance (H4). In models 3.3 and 3.4 the 
same relationships are tested binominally, with territorial conflict onsets coded as 1 on 
the dependent variable and government conflicts coded as 2. The only difference 
between model 3.3 and 3.4 is that the former uses dominance to supplement 
fragmentation while the latter uses balance. After testing different versions of 
dominance (not shown) it turns out the best results are obtained when the peak point is 
set at c=.4. Dominancec=.4 is therefore used instead of dominancec=.5.  
Interestingly, in Table 3 dominancec=.4 becomes significant at a 5 percent level, both in 
model 3.1 (ordinary regression) and in model 3.3 (binominal). Moreover, it appears 
that fragmentation has little if any effect on the risk of territorial conflicts; it is far 
from any relevant statistical significance. The results obtained in models 3.1 and 3.3 
thus point in the direction of general support for Hypothesis 3, that the risk of 
territorial conflict is highest in dominant systems. 
For conflicts over government, however, the results are not as expected. Instead of 
yielding statistical significance for balance, models 3.2 and 3.4 restore the significance 
of fragmentation, while rendering balance largely irrelevant. Since fragmentation did 
not form part of the hypothesis as such, a separate test was also done excluding 
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fragmentation. This returned a 5 percent significance level also for balance, but the 
log-likelihood of models 3.2 and 3.4 dropped from -220 to -226. The most important 
conclusion to be drawn in terms of conflict over government is therefore that 
fragmentation seems to be much more important than balance to explain the onset of 
this type of civil war. The support for Hypothesis 4 is therefore limited. 
In terms of the other variables in Table 3, GDP per capita has a higher and more 
significant effect on government conflicts than on territorial conflicts, while 
population turns out as highly significant (0,1 % level) for territorial conflicts, but is 
insignificant for government conflicts. Both of these results support the argument of 
relative rebel capability, as discussed above, since lower levels of GDP should 
increase the relative capability of a given ethnic group vis-à-vis the central 
 
Table 3: Logistic regressions disaggregated on actor aim 
        
 (3.1) (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  
 Terr. Gov.  Terr Gov Terr Gov 
Fragmentation 1.110 
(0.926) 
2.682** 
(0.934) 
 1.159 
(0.928) 
2.915** 
(0.910) 
1.442 
(0.941) 
2.696** 
(0.935) 
Dominance c=.4 2.240* 
(0.973) 
 
 
 2.244* 
(0.972) 
0.282 
(0.847) 
 
 
 
 
Balance g2/g1  
 
0.393 
(0.567) 
  
 
 
 
-0.477 
(0.645) 
0.386 
(0.569) 
Peace years -0.00809 
(0.0164) 
0.0161 
(0.0131) 
 -0.00789 
(0.0163) 
0.0163 
(0.0128) 
-0.00877 
(0.0155) 
0.0160 
(0.0131) 
GDP per capita lag -0.0519 
(0.0523) 
-0.171** 
(0.0651) 
 -0.0525 
(0.0524) 
-0.170** 
(0.0648) 
-0.0519 
(0.0537) 
-0.172** 
(0.0652) 
Ln(Population) lag 0.570*** 
(0.144) 
-0.0288 
(0.131) 
 0.570*** 
(0.144) 
-0.0300 
(0.133) 
0.532*** 
(0.143) 
-0.0222 
(0.132) 
Oil production pc 0.0115 
(0.0277) 
0.0409 
(0.0231) 
 0.0114 
(0.0280) 
0.0416 
(0.0225) 
0.0143 
(0.0246) 
0.0412 
(0.0231) 
Anocracy t=1 1.022* 
(0.431) 
0.571 
(0.351) 
 1.031* 
(0.430) 
0.611 
(0.348) 
1.040* 
(0.444) 
0.581 
(0.350) 
Political instability 0.0487 
(0.552) 
0.391 
(0.400) 
 0.0566 
(0.550) 
0.398 
(0.400) 
0.102 
(0.547) 
0.391 
(0.399) 
Ln(Mountains) -0.0302 
(0.143) 
0.0723 
(0.147) 
 -0.0303 
(0.143) 
0.0807 
(0.162) 
-0.0479 
(0.142) 
0.0712 
(0.146) 
Constant -12.54*** 
(1.704) 
-5.518*** 
(1.267) 
 -12.55*** 
(1.703) 
-5.639*** 
(1.552) 
-10.30*** 
(1.540) 
-5.569*** 
(1.271) 
Observations 5059 5059  5059  5059  
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.088  0.094  0.089  
AIC 359.7 463.2  822.3  826.5  
Log-likelihood -169.8 -221.6  -391.1  -393.2  
Countries 124 124  124  124  
Total onsets 31 42  115  115  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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government. Conversely, an increase in the size of a population reduces the ability of 
the government to control the whole territory of the state. This is consistent with the 
findings of Buhaug (2006), even though he uses geographic size instead of population 
to measure the size of a country. 
Another interesting feature of Table 3 is that anocracy, which was consistently 
significant at a 1 percent level in Table 2, appears to have lost much of its relevance. It 
is significant at a 5 percent level for territorial conflict, but not for conflicts over 
government. These results seem to be the reverse of what Buhaug (2006) finds in his 
tests. One possible explanation for this discrepancy could be that Buhaug includes 
both ethnic and non-ethnic onsets on the dependent variable, which in itself would 
alter the results. The fact that anocracy appears relevant when ethnic and non-ethnic 
government conflicts are tested together (as found by Buhaug) but not for ethnic 
government conflicts alone could suggest that anocracy primarily affects the non-
ethnic onsets of such conflicts. This notion would, however, require further testing 
before a conclusion could be drawn. 
5.6 Into democracy – a slight detour 
The question of anocracy points to a related, though slightly different view of the 
effects of ethnic heterogeneity. As mentioned earlier, John Stuart Mill (1926) is 
famous for having subscribed to a rather sobering view of the prospects for 
establishing functioning democracy in multiethnic states. These notions are not the 
main focus of this thesis, but it may serve to exemplify how the two-dimensional 
approach to ethnic heterogeneity (i.e. fragmentation and balance) can facilitate testing 
of other relevant variables besides ethnic conflict onsets. If certain constellations of 
ethnic groups show signs of being particularly conducive to anocratic forms of 
government – or rather non-government – then such tendencies merits scrutiny. 
Theoretically, the most plausible effect of ethnic heterogeneity on anocracy would be 
that the risk of anocracy increases in proportion to balance, that is; balanced systems 
should be more anarchic and hence more anocratic since no group is in a clear position 
to exert control over the other groups. This does not automatically translate into higher 
risk of conflict. Rather, it suggests that stability will be maintained by other means, 
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such as through balance-of-power and deterrence. The analogy to the international 
arena is evident, underlined by the frequent description in IR literature, particularly in 
the realist tradition, of the international system as ‘anarchic’ (see e.g. Morgenthau 
2006; Waltz 1964; Mearsheimer 2001; Glaser 2010).  
In terms of fragmentation one could also expect that more groups would increase the 
difficulties of establishing a functioning government, be it democratic or autocratic. As 
such, one could assume that the system properties conducive to anocracy would be 
much the same as those leading to ethnic conflict; general actor uncertainty, ethnic 
security dilemmas and high coordination costs. In other words, anocracy could be 
expected to correlate positively with both balance and fragmentation, though not 
necessarily with dominance. By extending the logic of this argument one could 
imagine that democracy should be negatively correlated with the same variables, since 
countries with low fragmentation and low balance would effectively approach a state 
of ethnic homogeneity. 
 
TABLE 3b: Logistic regressions on form of government 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anocracy Democracy Autocracy 
Fragmentation -0.451 
(0.595) 
-0.830 
(0.903) 
0.715 
(0.646) 
Balanceg2/g1 1.088** 
(0.345) 
0.150 
(0.579) 
-0.957* 
(0.432) 
Dominance c=.5 0.0618 
(0.331) 
-0.443 
(0.541) 
0.236 
(0.439) 
GDP per capita lag -0.138*** 
(0.0311) 
0.314*** 
(0.0416) 
-0.223*** 
(0.0395) 
Ln(Population) lag -0.0987 
(0.0878) 
0.138 
(0.158) 
-0.0173 
(0.105) 
Oil production pc 0.0139 
(0.0314) 
-0.203* 
(0.0930) 
0.177* 
(0.0762) 
Ln(Mountains) 0.250** 
(0.0810) 
-0.102 
(0.110) 
-0.115 
(0.0886) 
Constant -0.632 
(0.777) 
-2.868 
(1.492) 
0.999 
(0.962) 
Observations 5767 5767 5767 
pseudo R2 0.096 0.310 0.147 
AIC 5746.4 5099.4 6720.2 
Log-likelihood -2865.2 -2541.7 -3352.1 
Countries 127 127 127 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
N is limited to 127 due to missing GDP data for one country. 
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Table 3b shows how the ethnic heterogeneity variables fare in terms of explaining the 
outcomes of anocracy, democracy and autocracy respectively. Control variables 
related to political stability (peaceyears and political instability) are excluded in order 
to avoid problems of collinearity and endogeneity. The dependent variables are coded 
in binary form based on the Polity IV democracy index. Countries with scores between 
-5 and +5 are coded as anocratic, countries with scores above 6 are coded as 
democratic, while countries with scores from -6 and below are coded as autocratic. All 
variables are drawn from or calculated on the basis of the EPR dataset. 
Among the ethnic variables, only balance appears to have any significant effect on the 
form of government, and as suspected the relationship between balance and anocracy 
is positive. Neither dominance nor fragmentation reveals any particular pattern. The 
results thus suggest that it is not, in fact, the number of groups that influences the form 
of government, but the balance between them: The more equal the two largest groups 
are in size, the more difficult it seems to be to establish a stable form of government 
(either autocracy or democracy). 
That said, by far the strongest variable in all three models is GDP per capita, with 
consistent significance levels of 0,1 percent, though the direction of the relationship is 
positive only for democracy. These results are compelling, yet at the same time it 
could be argued that GDP per capita is as much the effect of the form of government 
as the cause. For that reason the models in Table 3b were also tested without GDP per 
capita among the control variables (not shown), and this made fragmentation turn out 
as significant (1% level) for both democracy and autocracy, negative for the former 
and positive for the latter. 
The aim of Table 3b – or for that matter this thesis – is by no means to provide an 
exhaustive set of explanations for or determinants of the form of government in a 
given country. This slight detour is simply an attempt to suggest that ethnic 
heterogeneity can be expected to have an impact on a range of different social and 
political outcomes, and that such relationships could be better understood with the aid 
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of improved statistical tools for testing heterogeneity and of a proper classification of 
multiethnic states.  
5.7 Some preliminary conclusions 
With that in mind, we can return to the main question of the thesis; ethnic conflict. 
From the results of the tests in Tables 1, 2 and 3 some preliminary conclusions can be 
drawn regarding how different ethnic constellations affect the potential for conflict, 
and what this implies for the four hypotheses. 
First, there is relatively strong support for Hypothesis 1 and the notion that 
fragmentation increases the risk of ethnic conflict. Linking this back to the theoretical 
foundation upon which the hypothesis is predicated the results suggest that more 
ethnic groups in a given country generally tends to; (i) increase the costs of 
coordination in the system, as the conventional ELF argument runs (c.f. Mauro 1995; 
Easterly & Levine 1997; La Porta et.al. 1999; Alesina et.al 1999, 2003); (ii) increase 
actor uncertainty and cause security dilemmas to arise, which in turn will be both 
countered and reinforced by strategies of deterrence and balance-of-power (c.f. 
Morgenthau 2006; Waltz 1964; Mearsheimer 2001), and; (iii) increase the centrifugal 
competition of the system and the probability of anti-system actors emerging (Sartori 
1990). 
The results thus seem to contradict both the theoretical notion of ‘interaction 
opportunities’ (Deutsch & Singer 1964) and the findings of Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol (2005) who conclude that the risk of conflict is highest on low levels of 
fragmentation (i.e. high polarization). One possible explanation for this discrepancy 
could be that Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, in line with most other contributions in the 
literature, measure the effect on a dependent variable that comprises both ethnic and 
non-ethnic conflicts. Another reason why the results are contradicting could be that the 
datasets they use for testing the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, in their case the World 
Christian Encyclopedia, are coded one-dimensionally (as described in Chapter 4). 
A second conclusion from the above tests is that there is only limited support for 
Hypothesis 2, which states that the risk ethnic conflict should be higher in dominant 
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systems than in either balanced or hegemonic systems. While stopping short of any 
viable statistical significance, the results in Table 2 suggest that the risk of ethnic 
conflict caused by dominance (c.f. Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Buhaug 2006; Cederman 
& Girardin 2007) is at its highest when the largest group is approximately double the 
size of the second largest group (c=.4 / c=.5). One example of such a constellation 
would be Afghanistan, where the Pashtun majority (41%) is about double the size of 
the second largest group, the Tajiks (25%).9
A noteworthy feature of these results is that, when combined, they seem to mirror the 
theoretical framework laid out by Mearsheimer (2001). As described above, 
Mearsheimer depicts bipolarity (i.e. few actors) as the most stable configuration; 
balanced multipolarity as less stable and; unbalanced multipolarity as the least stable. 
For what it’s worth, then, these results also seem to provide empirical support to 
Mearsheimer’s argument for the international arena. Such notions should be treated 
with a set of qualifications, however. As I have previously alluded to, the number of 
groups in a system does not directly translate into polarity, as understood by 
Mearsheimer. The bipolar structure of the Cold War was not a system of low 
fragmentation. Rather, it was a highly fragmented but relatively balanced system 
which split into two camps through a process of polarization – in Karl Deutsch’s 
(1971) original meaning of the term. Bipolarity during the Cold War was thus the 
result of an ‘economy of antipathy’, as Horowitz (1985:182) labels it, which caused 
pairs of antagonists to emerge as comparative reference groups, despite the plurality of 
actors.  
 
The third conclusion from the above is that dominance seems more important than 
fragmentation as a determinant of territorial conflict onsets. The opposite appears to be 
the case for government conflicts, where neither balance nor dominance returns any 
significant results once fragmentation is included. This provides general support for 
Hypothesis 3, but only limited support for Hypothesis 4.  
                                              
9 The percentages listed are drawn from the EPR dataset in the year 2000. See Appendix 1 for a full list of 
countries in the dataset. 
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Linking this back to the graphic model presented in Figure 2, it does indeed appear 
that the risk of conflict is highest at the point where majority control and minority 
capability intersect, though this is limited to territorial conflicts. Theoretically this 
makes sense when it is combined with the notion of relative rebel capability, as 
described by Buhaug (2006). On the other hand, the assumption that conflicts arising 
from dominance and minority exclusion should be highest in countries with low 
fragmentation (Figure 2b) is not supported.  
If we return to the examples mentioned in the introduction, it then appears that both Sri 
Lanka and Kenya may be typical cases, though for different types of conflicts. Sri 
Lanka, with a fragmentation value of .18 and a balance value of approximately .2, is 
among the countries with a low risk of government conflict, but a relatively high risk 
of territorial conflict. 10 Kenya, for its part, has a fragmentation score of .58, which 
makes it comparatively prone to government conflict.11
5.8 Robustness  
 On the other hand, Kenya also 
has a balance score of .55, suggesting that it may in fact also be prone to territorial 
conflict. This, however, would depend on a large set of other factors that contribute to 
the outbreak of civil wars. While Sri Lanka and Kenya may be typical, therefore, they 
also serve to underline that the overall explanatory power of ethnic heterogeneity for 
the onset of civil war remains limited. It is by no means a sufficient cause in itself. I 
will return to this below when discussing probabilities. 
None of the above tests have aimed to explain the onset of all civil wars (i.e. non-
ethnic), yet a test across a set of different dependent variables (both ethnic and non-
ethnic) may provide an indication as to the robustness of the results obtained, and in 
particular the robustness of the fragmentation variable. In Table 4, dominance and 
fragmentation are tested on a range of different dependent variables, the first three of 
                                              
10 Sri Lanka is listed with four relevant ethnic groups in the EPR dataset (for the year 2000): 
Sinhalese (70%), Indian Lankan Tamils (12%), Sri Lankan Tamils (11%) and Moors/Muslims (6%). 
11 Kenya is listed with seven relevant ethnic groups in the EPR dataset (for the year 2000):  
Kikuyu-Meru-Emb (27%), Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu (15%), Luhya (14%), Luo (12%), Kamba (11%), 
Kisii (6%) and Mijikenda (5%). 
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which are ethnically defined, while the last four include all civil war onsets. In terms 
of fragmentation, the results are quite convincing, with significant results for nearly all 
the models. The effect of dominance, on the other hand, remains insignificant 
throughout. 
When introducing the fragmentation measure, I suggested that the manner in which it 
was constructed should allow for easier testing across different sources of ethnic 
groups since it only takes into account the share of the two largest groups and 
compares these to the rest of the population. Table 5 shows how fragmentation 
effectively remains significant across various different ethnic datasets, ranging from 
the infamous ANM to the web-based Joshua Project,12
                                              
12 See http://www.joshuaproject.net/ 
 which contains detailed 
information on ethnic groups in just about every country in the world. The World 
Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) is split into two categories (models 5.2 and 5.3), one 
 
TABLE 4: Robustness across different conflict datasets 
 Ethnic onsets All onsets 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) 
 EPR EPR high FL EPR PRIO5 FL Sambanis 
Fragmentation 1.964** 
(0.711) 
2.019* 
(0.994) 
2.295*** 
(0.572) 
1.206* 
(0.537) 
1.157*** 
(0.334) 
1.329* 
(0.593) 
0.911 
(0.584) 
Dominance c=.5 0.716 
(0.458) 
0.834 
(0.572) 
0.158 
(0.304) 
-0.00531 
(0.298) 
-0.0592 
(0.242) 
-0.0524 
(0.339) 
-0.132 
(0.311) 
Peace years 0.00618 
(0.00981) 
-0.0163 
(0.0177) 
-0.00676 
(0.0135) 
-0.00573 
(0.00771) 
0.00279 
(0.00752) 
-0.0436** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0188 
(0.0110) 
GDP per capita lag -0.0987* 
(0.0423) 
-0.130 
(0.0748) 
-0.109* 
(0.0536) 
-0.118*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.0724** 
(0.0268) 
-0.102** 
(0.0381) 
-0.127** 
(0.0494) 
Ln(Population) lag 0.254* 
(0.0992) 
0.222 
(0.117) 
0.370*** 
(0.0799) 
0.141* 
(0.0709) 
0.233*** 
(0.0637) 
0.340*** 
(0.0897) 
0.0601 
(0.0634) 
Oil production pc 0.0195 
(0.0216) 
0.0336 
(0.0350) 
0.00496 
(0.0384) 
0.0370** 
(0.0123) 
0.0234* 
(0.0116) 
-0.00197 
(0.0445) 
0.0264 
(0.0368) 
Anocracy t=1 0.724** 
(0.261) 
0.771* 
(0.367) 
1.181*** 
(0.259) 
0.555** 
(0.181) 
0.552** 
(0.174) 
0.796** 
(0.249) 
0.532* 
(0.222) 
Political instability 0.248 
(0.290) 
0.341 
(0.405) 
-0.0644 
(0.332) 
0.531** 
(0.194) 
0.184 
(0.169) 
0.238 
(0.272) 
0.253 
(0.244) 
Ln(Mountains) 0.0404 
(0.109) 
0.300* 
(0.138) 
0.00981 
(0.115) 
0.0561 
(0.0618) 
0.142* 
(0.0630) 
0.119 
(0.0969) 
0.115 
(0.0804) 
Constant -7.628*** 
(1.087) 
-8.535*** 
(1.360) 
-8.668*** 
(0.881) 
-4.885*** 
(0.682) 
-6.252*** 
(0.655) 
-7.010*** 
(0.815) 
-4.671*** 
(0.669) 
Observations 5129 5353 5111 4880 5828 4359 5828 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.105 0.115 0.064 0.051 0.114 0.056 
AIC 723.0 424.5 620.9 1280.6 1498.7 816.8 928.3 
Log-likelihood -351.5 -202.2 -300.4 -630.3 -739.3 -398.4 -454.1 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
EPR: ethnic power relations; EPR high: same with 1000 deaths threshold; FL: Fearon & Laitin (2003); PRIO5: 
UCDP/PRIO ACD (5 year peace criterion); Sambanis: Sambanis (2004). 
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for the name of the different ethnic group (labeled autoglossonym in the dataset), and 
one for the culture to which these belong. The latter provides for a more generalized 
level with more groups placed under each culture, and it actually yields better results 
than the detailed level of the autoglossonym, with a higher coefficient and .1 percent 
significance. The data for the WCE is pulled from the online version of the 
encyclopedia and thus contains more updated information than the original from 1982 
used by Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005).13
Atlas Narodov Mira is actually the only dataset in which the fragmentation variable 
does not reach 5 percent significance.
 
14
                                              
13 See http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ 
 Interestingly, though, dominance becomes 
significant instead. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the number of 
observations changes slightly, but it also underlines how sensitive statistical tests of 
14 Data from the Atlas Narodov Mira is drawn from Weidmann et.al. (2010), whose project on the Geo-
referencing of Ethnic Groups is based on ANM data. See http://www.icr.ethz.ch/research/greg. 
 
TABLE 5: Robustness across different ethnic datasets 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) 
 EPR WCE WCE culture ANM JOSHUA 
Fragmentation 1.939** 
(0.708) 
1.884** 
(0.669) 
2.813*** 
(0.768) 
1.428 
(0.909) 
1.281* 
(0.628) 
Dominance c=.5 0.681 
(0.462) 
-0.316 
(0.517) 
-0.124 
(0.540) 
1.216** 
(0.416) 
0.428 
(0.434) 
Peace years 0.00590 
(0.00979) 
0.00370 
(0.00960) 
0.00587 
(0.00966) 
0.00885 
(0.0109) 
0.00171 
(0.00962) 
GDP per capita lag -0.0990* 
(0.0422) 
-0.105** 
(0.0377) 
-0.125** 
(0.0411) 
-0.101* 
(0.0409) 
-0.109** 
(0.0377) 
Ln(Population) lag 0.250* 
(0.0991) 
0.268** 
(0.102) 
0.214* 
(0.0944) 
0.269** 
(0.0993) 
0.287** 
(0.0994) 
Oil production pc 0.0194 
(0.0216) 
0.00762 
(0.00898) 
0.00948 
(0.00779) 
0.0168* 
(0.00764) 
0.0102 
(0.00837) 
Anocracy t=1 0.730** 
(0.261) 
0.718** 
(0.273) 
0.710* 
(0.280) 
0.679* 
(0.293) 
0.726** 
(0.269) 
Political instability 0.248 
(0.289) 
0.211 
(0.297) 
0.242 
(0.286) 
0.262 
(0.291) 
0.192 
(0.288) 
Ln(Mountains) 0.0376 
(0.109) 
0.0572 
(0.114) 
0.0286 
(0.110) 
0.0904 
(0.116) 
0.00572 
(0.105) 
Constant -7.551*** 
(1.095) 
-7.487*** 
(1.086) 
-6.907*** 
(0.910) 
-8.114*** 
(1.137) 
-7.645*** 
(0.994) 
Observations 5059 6036 6036 5605 6063 
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.080 0.082 0.106 0.081 
AIC 722.2 738.4 737.2 669.5 746.5 
Log-likelihood -351.1 -359.2 -358.6 -324.8 -363.3 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. EPR: Ethnic Power Relations, WCE: World Christian Encyclopedia (2009), ANM: 
Atlas Narodov Mira, JOSHUA: The Joshua Project. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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ethnic heterogeneity are to the actual coding of the groups, despite the use of relatively 
flexible measures like fragmentation. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the profoundness of 
this challenge by comparing the distributions of fragmentation and fractionalization 
for the ANM and EPR datasets. For fractionalization (Figure 7) – which is quite 
sensitive to individual coding decisions as it is calculated on the basis of all the groups 
in a given country – the discrepancy between the two datasets is surprisingly wide. 
The correlation is hardly perfect for fragmentation either (Figure 8), but it is possible 
to discern why this measure yields the best results across different datasets. 
Concretely, the correlation between the variables in the two datasets is .5572 for 
fractionalization and .7160 for fragmentation. 
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5.9  In terms of probabilities 
While the above findings provide some indications as to the direction and significance 
of the different variables that affect the risk of ethnic conflict, it does not supply much 
insight into to the actual change in probability. The pseudo R2 tends to remain below 
0.1 in all the tests, which is far from impressive. Moreover, the effect of both 
fragmentation and dominance are unlikely to be completely linear, and thus have the 
same effect on all levels. In Figures 9-12, the probability of territorial and government 
conflict is calculated for fragmentation and dominance/balance. The coefficients for 
these tests are taken from models 3.1 and 3.2.  
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Figure 9 illustrates how increasing levels of fragmentation affects the probability of 
territorial conflict. When going from minimum to maximum levels of fragmentation, 
the probability increases from approximately .0025 to around .007 – an effective 
increase of nearly 300 percent. For dominance (Figure 10), the corresponding numbers 
are from below .001 to about .006, an increase of about 600 percent. The actual 
probability, however, remains below 1 percent, and is similar on maximum levels of 
both fragmentation and dominance (.007 and .006). 
For conflict over government, the probability appears to be considerably higher in real 
terms. As Figure 11 shows, the probability of government conflict increases from 
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approximately .0025 to about .025 when going from the lowest to the highest value of 
fragmentation. This is effectively a near ten-fold increase. On the highest levels of 
fragmentation, this means that in real terms the probability of government conflict 
reaches about 2.5 percent. The effect of balance on government conflict (Figure 12) is 
much more limited, increasing from .0035 to a mere .005 when moving from 
minimum to maximum values. 
These are of course extreme values, making the probability axes slightly misleading. 
Very few countries are actually listed with fragmentation values much over .6. In fact, 
Uganda, Liberia and the DRC would be the only three. There is a certain logic to this, 
of course, since the two largest groups taken together only rarely would constitute less 
than 40 percent the total population. But quite a few countries are indeed situated on 
the borderline with fragmentation values of approximately .6, prompting the question 
of whether a threshold could be set for classifying the countries into main categories. 
5.10 Towards a classification of multiethnic states 
Based on the theoretical discussions and the empirical indications in this thesis it 
should now be possible to draw the outline of a classification for multiethnic states. 
The core of this classification would be the two main dimensions of balance and 
fragmentation. In order to create meaningful ‘data containers’, as Sartori (1970) calls 
it, each of these dimensions further require thresholds that places the countries into 
comparable classes. With two thresholds for each dimension, this would create nine 
classes of multiethnic states. 
For the balance dimension, the most logical values for these thresholds would be at 
B=.25 and B=.75, as discussed during the operationalization of Hypothesis 2 (Chapter 
3). If the value of B is below .25, the country would then be classified as ‘hegemonic’. 
If the value is above .75, it could be classified as ‘balanced’. Everything in between 
then falls into the ‘dominant’ class. This is based on the notion that the peak point of 
dominance is placed where majority intersects with minority capability (c.f. Figure 2), 
and that the risk of conflict from dominance decreases as it approaches either edge of 
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the model. This assumption has also been underpinned by the results obtained in the 
above regressions, in particular that of Table 3. 
For the fragmentation dimension, the issue becomes a bit more complicated. Both 
logically and theoretically, the easiest approach would be to adopt the categories used 
by Sartori (1990) for political parties. This would set the thresholds between 2 and 3 
groups, and between 5 and 6 groups. His contention is that three parties represent a 
fundamentally different interaction pattern than two parties, and that systems with 
more than five parties “tend to produce a different mechanics than the interactions 
among five-or-less parties”. At the same time, Sartori willingly notes that these 
thresholds are not absolutes and that the “borderline is not at five (or at six), but 
around five (or six)” (Sartori 1990:329, original italics). He further asserts that 
whether a system should be labeled limited or extreme pluralism eventually depends 
more on the ideological distance in the landscape than on the exact number of groups.  
Since ideological distance – which could also be understood as degree of polarization 
– is a relatively volatile property, it does not conform to the criteria for classification 
adhered to in this thesis. We are thus left with the a priori estimates provided by 
Sartori (1990), which yields three main categories; (i) dualism (two groups); (ii) 
limited pluralism (3-5 groups), and; (iii) extreme pluralism (6 groups or more). With 
two thresholds for each of the two dimensions, we can then attempt to place the 
countries of the EPR dataset into the framework. A distribution of the results is shown 
in Figure 13. The thresholds dividing the different classes are marked with dashed 
lines. 
While there is a clear conceptual advantage in using groups as the threshold marker 
(Figure 13), a question looms as to whether the numerical dimension of the 
classification should ultimately be based on the fragmentation measure or on the 
number of groups. There are sufficient arguments for favoring either approach. The 
fragmentation measure has the frequently mentioned benefit of easing the task of 
coding. Moreover, it provides an indication of the size of the groups without falling 
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hostage to the need for detailed information on all the relevant minorities. Equally 
important, fragmentation appears to return the most robust statistical results.  
 
 
 
 
As for the groups variable there is an obvious benefit in the simple interpretation of 
the measure: Four relevant groups mean four relevant groups. On the other hand, there 
is no way of knowing whether these four groups are similar in size, or whether some 
are more relevant than others. Where fragmentation takes into consideration the size of 
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the two largest actors, the groups variable simply counts them. The effect is that 
countries with very similar properties may end up in different categories when only the 
groups are counted. For instance, Peru is listed with four relevant groups in the EPR 
dataset, and the two largest groups – the Quechua (46 %) and the so-called Peruvians 
(42%) – together constitute close to 90 percent of the population. This places it in the 
class of balanced limited pluralism in Figure 13 (top center). Trinidad & Tobago, on 
the other hand, is listed with only two relevant groups, even though the two largest 
groups constitute 40 percent each. In other words, 20 percent of the population 
remains unaccounted for. The fragmentation score for Trinidad & Tobago is therefore 
higher than for Peru, yet there are only two relevant groups, compared to four in Peru. 
Consequently, when countries are classified by the number of relevant groups instead 
of by fragmentation, countries with quite similar properties may easily end up in 
different categories. If the fragmentation had been used instead of groups in the 
framework, Trinidad & Tobago and Peru would both have ended up in the class of 
balanced limited pluralism. 
The main drawback of using the fragmentation measure instead of groups is that the 
interpretation of the measure is much less intuitive. Theoretically this poses a 
challenge, and the most plausible solution may be to transform Sartori’s thresholds for 
groups into fragmentation scores. This is attempted in Figure 14 where fragmentation 
is replaced by the number of groups on the x-axis. The thresholds in this distribution 
have been calculated from the mean value of the fragmentation scores for the countries 
with 2-3 groups (.071) and 5-6 groups (.314) respectively. It is evidently possible to 
devise more cunning manners of setting these thresholds, but I will reserve such 
exploratory exercises for future projects.  
When comparing Figures 13 and 14, it becomes evident that there are considerable 
differences in the way groups and fragmentation classifies countries. A country like 
Gambia ends up in the category of balanced limited pluralism in Figure 12 since it is 
listed with only five relevant groups, while in Figure 14 it falls in the category of 
balanced extreme pluralism since the fragmentation value is higher than the number of 
groups suggests. By contrast, China is listed with a total of 47 relevant groups in the 
71 
 
EPR dataset, yet the fragmentation value is only .37 since most of these groups are 
relatively small compared to the Han majority.15
Tables 6 and 7 show the frequency distribution of Figures 13 and 14. The number of 
relevant groups is used in Table 6 and fragmentation is used in Table 7. The thresholds 
on the balance dimension are the same for both tables. The main difference between 
the two is that Table 7 provides a more even distribution between the three classes of 
fragmentation; dualism, limited pluralism and extreme pluralism. The threshold values 
are the same as for Figure 14 and are noted in the column headings. 
  
These differences may be marginal, but the point I strive to make is that the criteria for 
classification of multiethnic states should not just be guided by theoretical 
assumptions. They should also be judged by their ability to group countries with 
similar attributes into similar categories. The question of classification is thus also an 
empirical question. A precondition should be that the thresholds have some substantive 
meaning. Sartori (1970:1039) points to this when he suggests that the interaction 
 
Table 6: Frequency distribution by balance and groups 
  
Dualism 
(2 groups) 
Limited 
Pluralism 
(3-5 groups) 
Extreme 
Pluralism 
(6- groups) 
 
N 
  Balanced 
 
4 10 3 
 
17 
Dominant 
 
4 26 15 
 
45 
Hegemonic 
 
21 31 13 
 
65 
N 
 
29 67 31 
 
127 
  
                                              
15 Note that in Figure 13, a ceiling has been set on the number of groups so that countries with more than 10 
groups (such as China) are listed with only 10. 
Table 7: Frequency distribution by balance and fragmentation 
  
Dualism 
(F<.071) 
Limited 
Pluralism 
( F>=.071) 
Extreme 
Pluralism 
( F>=.314) 
 
N 
  Balanced 
 
2 7 8 
 
17 
Dominant 
 
10 11 24 
 
45 
Hegemonic 
 
35 25 5 
 
65 
N 
 
47 43 37 
 
127 
72 
 
between three to five groups is likely to be substantively different from the interaction 
between six of more groups.  
In practical terms, one could ask whether the countries classified under balanced 
limited pluralism share a particular political dynamic that distinguishes these from the 
other countries in the sample. If so, then the classification of these into one category is 
useful as it allows for both intra-class and inter-class comparisons. For such is the 
fundamental rationale of classification; to facilitate the exercise of comparison.  
This points to a final check of whether the number of groups or the fragmentation 
measure should be used to classify the countries along the numerical dimension of the 
framework, namely whether the properties of the groups in the different classes are 
indeed similar and comparable. A thorough analysis of this goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but a brief look at one of the classes could prove useful. 
Table 8 lists the countries that fall under the category of balanced limited pluralism 
when using the groups variable as the selection criterion for the numerical dimension. 
The countries are placed in descending order by the size of the largest group. The 
general similarity between most of the countries on the list testifies to the comparative 
potential inherent in the classification. The countries are highly balanced, with the two 
largest groups making up between 50 and 88 percent of the total population. Yet, there 
is one peculiar exception: Liberia. 
 
Table 8: Countries classified as Balanced Limited Pluralism – by groups 
 
Country Bal. Gr. Frag. 
 
Group 1 % 
 
Group 2 % 
Bosnia-Herzegovina .79 4 .16 
 
Bosniaks/Muslims 47 
 
Serbs 37.1 
Peru .92 4 .12 
 
Quechua 46 
 
Peruvians 42.5 
Mauritania .75 3 .30 
 
Haratins (Black Moors) 40 
 
Black Africans 30 
Guinea .75 3 .30 
 
Peul 40 
 
Malinke 30 
Bolivia .95 4 .28 
 
Quechua 37 
 
Bolivians 35 
Congo .86 5 .35 
 
Nibolek (Bembe etc.) 35 
 
Lari/Bakongo 30 
Nepal .97 4 .37 
 
Hill Brahmins/Chetri 32 
 
Madhesi 31 
Gabon .92 4 .50 
 
Fang 26 
 
Eshira/Bapounou 24 
Liberia .88 5 .85 
 
Gio 8 
 
Mano 7 
(Source: EPR, classification by balance and relevant groups) 
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With the largest group (Gio) constituting only 8 percent of the population, one 
wonders whether the mechanics of the Liberian ethnic relations are at all comparable 
to those of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the largest group constitutes 47 percent. What 
they have in common is a similar number of relevant groups and a relatively high 
balance score. But it makes little sense to classify the Liberian case as limited 
pluralism. One could argue, of course, that the reason why Liberia has been included 
in this category stems from the failure to code all the relevant groups in Liberia. There 
should evidently have been more of them in order to fill up the full share of the 
population. But this misses the point. It might very well be that Liberia has only five 
politically relevant ethnic groups. Yet, if the vast majority of the population in a 
country remains unaccounted for, the result is that the number of groups ceases to 
function as a viable criterion for comparison. 
 
In Table 9, the same exercise is conducted with fragmentation as the numerical 
criterion. This reduces the number of countries in the class to seven, but in return it 
escapes the problem of outliers. For easy reading and comparison, the countries that 
appear in bold are present in both Tables 8 and 9. Note that two of the countries in 
Table 9 have only two relevant groups, yet together these constitute less than 90 
percent of the population. The range in the size of the largest group is also smaller in 
Table 9 than in Table 8, with a mere 11 percentage point span (compared to 21 in 
Table 8 when Liberia is excluded).  
Table 9: Countries classified as Balanced Limited Pluralism – by fragmentation 
 
Country Bal. Gr. Frag. 
 
Group 1 % 
 
Group 2 % 
Madagascar .82 2 .13 
 
Côtiers 48 
 
Highlanders 40 
Bosnia-Herzegovina .79 4 .16 
 
Bosniaks/Muslims 47 
 
Serbs 37 
Peru .92 4 .12 
 
Quechua 46 
 
Peruvians 43 
Trinidad and Tobago .98 2 .20 
 
East Indians 40 
 
Blacks 40 
Mauritania .75 3 .30 
 
Haratins (Black Moors) 40 
 
Black Africans 30 
Guinea .75 3 .30 
 
Peul 40 
 
Malinke 30 
Bolivia .95 4 .28 
 
Quechua 37 
 
Bolivians 35 
(Source: EPR, classification by balance and fragmentation) 
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These brief examples suggest that alongside balance, fragmentation may be the most 
viable numerical criterion for the classification of multiethnic states, as it categorizes 
countries into clusters of relative similarity. This may all in all outweigh the drawback 
related to the interpretation of the measure. 
That said, the eventual utility and applicability of such a classification of multiethnic 
states will only become apparent once more profound studies into the internal 
dynamics of countries in the different classes have been undertaken. Until then, the 
thresholds and criteria for classification will remain indicative. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
Over the last two decades ethnically motivated civil wars have become a growing 
concern for researchers as well as for politicians. As the opening quote of this paper 
suggests, “[t]he importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a 
phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied” 
(Horowitz 1985:XV). Yet, despite the frequency and devastation caused by such 
conflicts, we still know remarkably little about the root causes and mechanisms that lie 
at the heart of the problem. In the large N literature, considerable effort has been put 
into identifying factors that might increase the risk of conflict. Some of these 
contributions have focused on material factors such as economic growth, natural 
resources or even topography, while others have drawn attention to the cultural and 
social causes of civil war The focus of this thesis has firmly been placed within the 
latter strand of scientific discourse, as I have stepped into the debate on ethnic 
heterogeneity and its effects on the risk of ethnic conflict. 
The core research question of the thesis has been whether some multiethnic 
configurations are more prone to conflict than others. This approach is largely 
motivated by the frequent notions of inevitability that proliferate during discussions on 
the causes of ethnic conflict. Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Kenya served as preliminary 
examples of countries where dominance or fragmentation appears to make ethnic strife 
predestined.  
With this motivational backdrop I started by providing an overview of the previous 
literature on the subject of ethnic heterogeneity. Three different arguments were 
identified: (i) that the risk of ethnic conflict increases with the number of groups; (ii) 
that the risk of ethnic conflict is highest with only two large groups, and; (iii) that the 
risk of conflict is highest when one group dominates, but not overwhelmingly so. I 
then suggested that these arguments, as well as the landscape of ethnic heterogeneity, 
is better comprehended if mapped along two main dimensions; one capturing the 
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number of groups (fragmentation) and the other capturing the balance between the 
groups.  
I then went on to elaborate the theoretical framework upon which these arguments rest, 
drawing largely on IR theory and political science. This discussion subsequently 
formed the basis for four main hypotheses; (i) that fragmentation increases the risk of 
conflict; (ii) that dominance increases the risk of conflict; (iii) that territorial conflict is 
most likely in dominant systems, and; (iv) that government conflict is most likely in 
balanced systems. 
In Chapter 3 the operationalization of these hypotheses was discussed and a set of 
different measure introduced. Some were drawn from previous research while others 
were introduced as new alternative measures. In particular, I proposed a new measure 
of fragmentation that I argued should be more robust than previously applied measures 
like fractionalization and polarization. I further introduced a measure of dominance 
that uses the relative size of the two largest groups to identify the balance point 
between them at which the risk of conflict is at its highest. 
Chapter 4 dealt with some of the methodological issues related to the study of ethnic 
heterogeneity and conflict, roughly categorized as input problems and output 
problems. In these discussions I reiterated some of the criticism advanced against 
previously used datasets, and suggested that the recently compiled EPR datasets by 
Wimmer et.al (2009) is the most reliable source of data for both ethnic groups and 
ethnic conflict onsets available. 
In Chapter 5 the results from the testing of the different hypotheses were presented and 
discussed. I found considerable support for the conventional argument that ethnically 
fragmented countries are more prone to conflict than countries with low fragmentation, 
but less support for the second hypothesis which states that dominance increases the 
risk of ethnic conflict. When the dependent variable was disaggregated into territorial 
and government conflicts, I found that dominance is a significant determinant for 
territorial conflict but not for conflicts over government. The reverse appears to be the 
case for fragmentation. This translates into very strong support for Hypothesis 1, only 
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limited support for Hypothesis 2, relatively strong support for Hypothesis 3, while 
Hypothesis 4 should be rejected. 
These findings contribute towards painting a more nuanced picture of how ethnic 
heterogeneity affects the risk of civil war. At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that as long as the research on ethnic heterogeneity is limited to identifying 
patterns of increasing and falling risk, the substantive implications in terms of peace-
building will remain limited. When Kenyans went to the polls on August 5, 2010 to 
decide on a new constitution, it would have made little difference to know that the 
country belongs to a class of multiethnic states labeled dominant extreme pluralism, 
and that the risk of conflict therefore should be high. If the research on ethnic conflict 
is to have any substantive impact on policy, the agenda needs to go beyond the mere 
mapping of tendencies and towards a better understanding of how the number of 
groups and their relative size affects the political dynamics and social interaction in a 
given country. Such insight might very well require more qualitatively and 
comparatively oriented studies. In the words of Donald Horowitz (1985:13); “the need 
for comparative analysis is compelling”.  
With this acknowledgement in mind I have suggested that the two dimensions of 
balance and fragmentation could form the basis for a classification of multiethnic 
states that, in turn, could facilitate more comparatively oriented studies. However, the 
strength and utility of this classification will only become evident once more 
qualitatively oriented studies have been undertaken, by which the comparative 
potential of the various categories can be mapped. Until then, the classification should 
be treated as a preliminary draft – as analytical scaffolding by which the research on 
ethnic heterogeneity can be further developed. In the meantime, the statistical research 
on ethnic heterogeneity can give us some indications as to the configurations of ethnic 
groups that are more and less prone to ethnic conflicts. The findings in this paper 
suggest that dominant systems are slightly more conflict-prone that hegemonic and 
balanced systems, but the strongest tendency identified is that high levels of 
fragmentation increases the risk of conflict – or in lay terms; the more the messier.  
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8 Appendix 1 
List of countries with main ethnic variables (Source: EPR Dataset) 
Country Bal. Gr. Frag. g1 g2 
Afghanistan 0,61 9 0,34 41% 25% 
Albania 0,03 3 0,02 95% 3% 
Algeria 0,38 2 0,01 72% 27% 
Angola 0,68 5 0,36 38% 26% 
Argentina 0,01 2 0,16 83% 1% 
Armenia 0,01 3 0,01 98% 1% 
Australia 0,02 2 0,14 84% 2% 
Austria 0,01 2 0,06 93% 1% 
Azerbaijan 0,04 3 0,07 90% 3% 
Bangladesh 0,13 4 0,02 87% 11% 
Belarus (Byelorussia) 0,17 3 0,09 78% 13% 
Belgium 0,68 3 0,01 59% 40% 
Benin 0,56 4 0,49 33% 19% 
Bolivia 0,95 4 0,28 37% 35% 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0,79 4 0,16 47% 37% 
Brazil 0,80 2 0,01 55% 44% 
Bulgaria 0,11 3 0,08 83% 9% 
Burundi 0,16 2 0,01 85% 14% 
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 0,04 5 0,09 88% 4% 
Cameroon 0,72 6 0,57 25% 18% 
Canada 0,39 3 0,18 59% 23% 
Central African Republic 0,30 4 0,57 33% 10% 
Chad 0,58 6 0,62 24% 14% 
Chile 0,04 3 0,04 92% 4% 
China 0,12 47 0,37 57% 7% 
Colombia 0,32 3 0,04 73% 23% 
Congo 0,86 5 0,35 35% 30% 
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire) 0,64 13 0,74 16% 10% 
Costa Rica 0,02 2 0,05 93% 2% 
Cote D’Ivoire 0,65 4 0,44 34% 22% 
Croatia 0,05 5 0,06 90% 5% 
Cuba 0,49 2 0,00 67% 33% 
Czech Republic 0,03 3 0,03 94% 3% 
Czechoslovakia 0,49 4 0,07 63% 31% 
Dominican Republic 0,08 2 0,00 93% 7% 
Ecuador 0,73 3 0,05 55% 40% 
Egypt 0,10 2 0,01 90% 9% 
Eritrea 0,96 2 0,02 50% 48% 
Estonia 0,38 4 0,07 68% 26% 
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Ethiopia 0,94 8 0,38 32% 30% 
Finland 0,06 2 0,01 93% 6% 
France 0,01 4 0,01 98% 1% 
Gabon 0,92 5 0,50 26% 24% 
Gambia 0,48 5 0,42 40% 19% 
Georgia 0,12 7 0,23 69% 8% 
Ghana 0,68 5 0,42 35% 24% 
Greece 0,02 3 0,01 97% 2% 
Guatemala 0,65 4 0,01 60% 39% 
Guinea 0,75 3 0,30 40% 30% 
Guinea-Bissau 0,47 3 0,56 30% 14% 
Haiti 0,05 2 0,00 95% 5% 
Honduras 0,05 6 0,04 91% 5% 
Hungary 0,06 2 0,05 90% 5% 
India 0,51 19 0,60 26% 13% 
Indonesia 0,11 7 0,50 45% 5% 
Iran (Persia) 0,55 11 0,32 44% 24% 
Iraq 0,30 3 0,18 63% 19% 
Israel 0,74 6 0,46 31% 23% 
Japan 0,01 4 0,02 97% 1% 
Jordan 0,69 2 0,02 58% 40% 
Kazakhstan 0,56 7 0,17 53% 30% 
Kenya 0,56 7 0,58 27% 15% 
Kuwait 0,60 3 0,60 25% 15% 
Kyrgyz Republic 0,21 4 0,21 65% 14% 
Laos 0,24 8 0,37 51% 12% 
Latvia 0,49 4 0,13 59% 29% 
Lebanon 0,67 9 0,40 36% 24% 
Liberia 0,88 5 0,85 8% 7% 
Lithuania 0,08 3 0,10 84% 7% 
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) 0,35 5 0,11 66% 23% 
Madagascar (Malagasy) 0,82 2 0,13 48% 40% 
Malawi 0,68 7 0,53 28% 19% 
Malaysia 0,44 5 0,17 58% 25% 
Mali 0,11 2 0,00 90% 10% 
Mauritania 0,75 3 0,30 40% 30% 
Mexico 0,13 2 0,04 85% 11% 
Moldova 0,21 5 0,19 67% 14% 
Mongolia 0,08 2 0,07 86% 7% 
Morocco 0,00 1 0,60 40% 0% 
Mozambique 0,34 3 0,62 29% 10% 
Myanmar (Burma) 0,13 12 0,24 68% 9% 
Namibia 0,19 11 0,41 50% 9% 
Nepal 0,97 4 0,37 32% 31% 
Netherlands 0,12 2 0,05 85% 10% 
New Zealand 0,11 3 0,04 87% 10% 
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Nicaragua 0,11 4 0,07 85% 9% 
Niger 0,39 5 0,22 56% 22% 
Nigeria 0,72 6 0,50 29% 21% 
Pakistan 0,17 7 0,25 64% 11% 
Panama 0,08 2 0,08 85% 7% 
Paraguay 0,02 2 0,04 94% 2% 
Peru 0,92 4 0,12 46% 43% 
Philippines 0,09 4 0,07 86% 8% 
Poland 0,01 5 0,00 99% 1% 
Rumania 0,07 4 0,04 90% 7% 
Russia (Soviet Union) 0,05 36 0,16 80% 4% 
Rwanda 0,18 2 0,01 84% 15% 
Saudi Arabia 0,72 4 0,38 36% 26% 
Senegal 0,53 5 0,34 44% 23% 
Sierra Leone 0,79 3 0,32 38% 30% 
Slovakia 0,13 3 0,09 81% 10% 
Slovenia 0,02 6 0,15 83% 2% 
South Africa 0,82 6 0,60 22% 18% 
Spain 0,25 5 0,15 68% 17% 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 0,17 4 0,18 70% 12% 
Sudan 0,68 13 0,58 25% 17% 
Switzerland 0,26 3 0,21 62% 16% 
Syria 0,19 5 0,26 62% 12% 
Taiwan 0,17 3 0,02 84% 14% 
Tajikistan 0,19 5 0,05 80% 15% 
Thailand 0,05 4 0,23 74% 4% 
Togo 0,61 2 0,29 44% 27% 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,98 2 0,20 40% 40% 
Turkey/Ottoman Empire 0,21 2 0,01 82% 17% 
Turkmenistan 0,06 4 0,10 85% 5% 
Uganda 0,88 6 0,70 16% 14% 
Ukraine 0,22 5 0,05 78% 17% 
United Kingdom 0,12 7 0,09 82% 10% 
United States of America 0,18 6 0,18 69% 13% 
Uzbekistan 0,07 5 0,15 80% 6% 
Venezuela 0,12 2 0,04 86% 10% 
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 0,02 10 0,20 78% 2% 
Vietnam, Republic of 0,01 2 0,21 78% 1% 
Yemen 0,43 3 0,20 56% 24% 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 0,27 6 0,21 62% 17% 
Zambia 0,44 7 0,38 43% 19% 
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 0,26 3 0,03 77% 20% 
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9 Appendix 2 
DO-FILES (for STATA) 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING PRIO-DATA -------------------------- */ 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
 
use "UCDP_PRIO_v42009_mainconflicttable.dta", clear 
save "temp_ucdp-PRIO.dta", replace 
 
 
rename location country 
 
keep if type==3 | type==4 
 
keep year country gwnoa type incomp intensity 
 
rename gwnoa gwno 
replace gwno = 750 if country == "Hyderabad" 
 
gsort +gwno +year 
 
gen PRIO_cw=0 
replace PRIO_cw=1 if intensity==1 | intensity==2 
 
gen PRIO_25=0 
replace PRIO_25=1 if intensity==1 
 
gen PRIO_1000=0 
replace PRIO_1000=1 if intensity==2 
 
gen PRIO_terr=0 
replace PRIO_terr = 1 if incomp==1 
 
gen PRIO_gov=0 
replace PRIO_gov = 1 if incomp==2 
 
rename incomp PRIO_incomp 
 
egen yearc = concat(gwno year) 
destring yearc, replace 
 
sort yearc 
 
by yearc: egen incompmed = median(PRIO_incomp) 
by yearc: keep if PRIO_incomp == incompmed 
by yearc: keep if _n==1 
 
sort yearc 
 
save "temp_ucdp-PRIO.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ 
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use "PRIO_onsets.dta" 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
merge yearc using "temp_ucdp-PRIO.dta", update 
 
replace PRIO_cw=0 if PRIO_cw==. 
replace PRIO_25=0 if PRIO_25==. 
replace PRIO_1000=0 if PRIO_1000==. 
replace PRIO_incomp=0 if PRIO_incomp==. 
replace PRIO_terr=0 if PRIO_terr==. 
replace PRIO_gov=0 if PRIO_gov==. 
replace intensity=0 if intensity==. 
replace type=0 if type==. 
 
drop _merge 
 
gsort +country +year 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ---------------- ADD SAMBANIS VARS - ONSETS ONLY ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ---------------------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ---------------------------- ----------------- */ 
 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
use "Sambanis.dta", clear 
save "Sambanis_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
rename cowcode gwno 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
egen yearc = concat(gwno year) 
destring yearc, replace 
 
rename warstns SCW_onset 
rename elfo ANM_ethfrac 
rename ethfrac FL_ethfrac 
 
 
keep yearc year country gwno SCW_onset ncontig lnmtn warst1 warst1b warst2 
warst2b warst3 warst4 warst5 warst6 warst7 warst8 warst9 warst10 warst11  
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "Sambanis_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ------------ MERGING SAMBANIS (DSCW_onset) -------- */ 
 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +yearc 
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merge yearc using "Sambanis_TEMP.dta", update 
 
replace SCW_onset=0 if missing(SCW_onset) 
replace warst7=0 if missing(warst7) 
 
duplicates drop 
drop if missing(onset2) 
drop _merge 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
/* ---------------- MAKING SYSTEM VARS FROM EPR ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ---------------------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ---------------------------- ----------------- */ 
 
 
use "EPR_groupyear_v1.1.dta", clear 
save "EPR_groupyear_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
keep cowcode year statename size group stateabb 
 
rename cowcode gwno 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
egen yearc = concat(gwno year) 
destring yearc, replace 
 
gsort +year +statename 
 
by year statename, sort: egen systemgroups=count(size) 
 
gen EPR_groups = systemgroups 
gen EPR_groupsl = log(systemgroups) 
gen EPR_interops = systemgroups*(systemgroups-1)/2 
 
replace systemgroups = 10 if systemgroups>10 
 
gen EPR_groups5peak=((systemgroups-5)^2*(-1)+25)*.04 
 
 
 
gsort +year +statename -size 
 
gen propSQ=size*size*(1-size) 
by year statename: egen EPR_ethpol = total(propSQ*4) 
drop propSQ 
 
gen propSQ=size*(1-size) 
by year statename: egen EPR_ethfrac = total(propSQ) 
drop propSQ 
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by year statename: gen g1 = group 
by year statename: gen p1 = size 
 
by year statename: gen g2 = group[_n+1] 
by year statename: gen p2 = size[_n+1] 
 
by year statename: gen g3 = group[_n+2] 
by year statename: gen p3 = size[_n+2] 
 
by year statename: gen g4 = group[_n+3] 
by year statename: gen p4 = size[_n+3] 
 
by year statename: gen g5 = group[_n+4] 
by year statename: gen p5 = size[_n+4] 
 
by year statename: gen g6 = group[_n+5] 
by year statename: gen p6 = size[_n+5] 
 
by year statename: gen g7 = group[_n+6] 
by year statename: gen p7 = size[_n+6] 
 
by year statename: gen g8 = group[_n+7] 
by year statename: gen p8 = size[_n+7] 
 
by year statename: gen g9 = group[_n+8] 
by year statename: gen p9 = size[_n+8] 
 
by year statename: gen g10 = group[_n+9] 
by year statename: gen p10 = size[_n+9] 
 
by year statename: gen g11 = group[_n+10] 
by year statename: gen p11 = size[_n+10] 
 
replace p2 = 0 if missing(p2) 
replace p3 = 0 if missing(p3) 
replace p4 = 0 if missing(p4) 
replace p5 = 0 if missing(p5) 
replace p6 = 0 if missing(p6) 
replace p7 = 0 if missing(p7) 
replace p8 = 0 if missing(p8) 
replace p9 = 0 if missing(p9) 
replace p10 = 0 if missing(p10) 
replace p11 = 0 if missing(p11) 
 
 
by year statename, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
 
/* ---------------- BALANCE ------------------------------- */ 
 
 
gen bal=p2/p1 
gen EPR_order = 1-p1-p2 
 
gen EPR_balclass = "M" 
replace EPR_balclass = "H" if bal>=.1 
replace EPR_balclass = "D" if bal>=.33 
replace EPR_balclass = "B" if bal>=.66 
 
gen EPR_groupclass = 0 
replace EPR_groupclass = 1 if EPR_groups==2 
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replace EPR_groupclass = 2 if EPR_groups>=3 
replace EPR_groupclass = 3 if EPR_groups>=6 
 
gen EPR_orderclass = 1 
replace EPR_orderclass = 2 if EPR_order>=.1 
replace EPR_orderclass = 3 if EPR_order>=.33 
 
gen EPR_class_B1 = 0 
replace EPR_class_B1 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "B" & EPR_orderclass== 1 
gen EPR_class_B2 = 0 
replace EPR_class_B2 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "B" & EPR_orderclass== 2 
gen EPR_class_B3 = 0 
replace EPR_class_B3 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "B" & EPR_orderclass== 3 
 
gen EPR_class_D1 = 0 
replace EPR_class_D1 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "D" & EPR_orderclass== 1 
gen EPR_class_D2 = 0 
replace EPR_class_D2 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "D" & EPR_orderclass== 2 
gen EPR_class_D3 = 0 
replace EPR_class_D3 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "D" & EPR_orderclass== 3 
 
gen EPR_class_H1 = 0 
replace EPR_class_H1 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "H" & EPR_orderclass== 1 
gen EPR_class_H2 = 0 
replace EPR_class_H2 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "H" & EPR_orderclass== 2 
gen EPR_class_H3 = 0 
replace EPR_class_H3 = 1 if EPR_balclass== "H" & EPR_orderclass== 3 
 
egen EPR_system = concat(EPR_balclass EPR_orderclass) 
 
 
 
/* ---------------- DOMINANCE ------------------------------------------ */ 
 
local c=1 
gen EPR_balance10 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.9 
gen EPR_balance9 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.8 
gen EPR_balance8 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.7 
gen EPR_balance7 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.6 
gen EPR_balance6 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.59 
gen EPR_balance59 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.58 
gen EPR_balance58 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.57 
gen EPR_balance57 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.56 
gen EPR_balance56 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.55 
gen EPR_balance55 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.54 
gen EPR_balance54 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
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local c=.53 
gen EPR_balance53 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.52 
gen EPR_balance52 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.51 
gen EPR_balance51 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.5 
gen EPR_balance5 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.4 
gen EPR_balance4 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.3 
gen EPR_balance3 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.2 
gen EPR_balance2 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.1 
gen EPR_balance1 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
local c=.0 
gen EPR_balance0 =(-(p2/p1-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
 
gen EPR_balancelin = (bal*-1)+1 
gen EPR_balancexp = ((bal-1)*-(bal-1))*-1 
 
 
 
gen EPR_ethdom45 = 0 
replace EPR_ethdom45 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace EPR_ethdom45 = 0 if p1<=.45 
 
gen EPR_ethdom55 = 0 
replace EPR_ethdom55 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace EPR_ethdom55 = 0 if p1<=.55 
 
rename size largestgroup 
move largestgroup statename 
 
gsort +year +statename 
 
 
save "EPR_groupyear_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
rename p1 EPR_p1 
rename p2 EPR_p2 
rename bal EPR_bal 
 
gen EPR_BPxG = EPR_bal*EPR_groups 
gen EPR_B5xG = EPR_balance5*EPR_groups 
gen EPR_B6xG = EPR_balance6*EPR_groups 
gen EPR_BPxGl = EPR_bal*EPR_groupsl 
gen EPR_B5xGl = EPR_balance5*EPR_groupsl 
gen EPR_balance5inv = 1-EPR_balance5 
gen EPR_B5xGlneg = EPR_balance5inv*EPR_groupsl 
gen EPR_B6xGl = EPR_balance6*EPR_groupsl 
 
gen EPR_balxp1 = EPR_bal*EPR_p1 
gen EPR_balxp1_x2 = EPR_bal*(EPR_p1+EPR_p1) 
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gen EPR_balxp1neg = EPR_bal*(1-EPR_p1) 
gen EPR_bal5xp1 = EPR_balance5*EPR_p1 
gen EPR_balxp5neg = EPR_balance5*(1-EPR_p1) 
gen EPR_multiheg = (1-EPR_bal)*EPR_order 
gen EPR_bal4xorder = EPR_balance4*EPR_order 
gen EPR_bal5xorder = EPR_balance5*EPR_order 
 
save "EPR_groupyear_TEMP_full.dta", replace 
 
 
drop if missing(EPR_system) 
rename statename country 
gsort +country -year 
 
duplicates drop 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "EPR_groupyear_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
clear  
/* ---------------- MERGING INTO PRIO-onsets ----------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +yearc 
merge yearc using "EPR_groupyear_TEMP.dta", update 
 
drop _merge 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING WCE FULL ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
 
use "WCE2005_full.dta", clear 
save "WCE2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
replace country = "Antigua and Barbuda" if country == "Antigua" 
replace country = "British Virgin Islands" if country == "British Virgin 
Is" 
replace country = "Central African Republic" if country == "Central African 
Rep" 
replace country = "Congo, Republic of the" if country == "Congo" 
replace country = "Congo, Democratic Republic of" if country == "DR Congo" 
replace country = "Cote d'Ivoire" if country == "Ivory Coast" 
replace country = "Micronesia, Federated States of" if country == 
"Micronesia" 
replace country = "Myanmar (Burma)" if country == "Myanmar" 
replace country = "Korea, North" if country == "North Korea" 
replace country = "Korea, South" if country == "South Korea" 
replace country = "United Kingdom" if country == "Britain" 
replace country = "Vatican City" if country == "Holy See" 
replace country = "Malvinas" if country == "Falkland Islands" 
replace country = "Northern Mariana Islands" if country == "Northern 
Mariana Is" 
replace country = "Cyprus" if country == "Northern Cyprus" 
replace country = "Saint Kitts and Nevis" if country == "Saint Kitts & 
Nevis" 
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replace country = "Saint Pierre and Miquelon" if country == "Saint Pierre & 
Miquelon" 
replace country = "St Vincent and Grenadines" if country == "Saint Vincent" 
replace country = "Sao Tome and Principe" if country == "São Tomé & 
Príncipe" 
replace country = "Timor Leste" if country == "Timor" 
replace country = "Trinidad and Tobago" if country == "Trinidad & Tobago" 
replace country = "Turks and Caicos Islands" if country == "Turks & Caicos 
Is" 
replace country = "Virgin Islands (U.S.)" if country == "Virgin Is of the 
US" 
replace country = "West Sahara" if country == "Sahara" 
replace country = "Wallis Futuna Islands" if country == "Wallis Futuna Is" 
 
kountry country, from(other) stuck 
drop if missing(_ISO3N_) 
sort _ISO3N_ 
 
drop country 
rename NAMES_STD country 
rename _ISO3N_ iso3n 
 
kountry iso3n, from(iso3n) to(cown) 
rename _COWN_ gwno 
 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
 
/* ---------- ADDING ETHPOL byGROUP VARIABLE (INDEPENDENT) ----------- */ 
 
save "WCE2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
 
rename pop_2005 pop2005 
rename people_name group 
 
keep country gwno group pop2005 
 
gsort +country +group 
 
by country: egen total = total(pop2005) 
move total pop2005 
 
gen size = (pop2005/total) 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*size*(1-size) 
by country: egen WCE_ethpol = total(sizeSQ*4) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*(1-size) 
by country: egen WCE_ethfrac = total(sizeSQ) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
drop if missing(gwno) 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by size, sort: keep if size > .01 
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by country, sort: egen systemgroups=count(size) 
 
 
/* ---------------- MAKING SYSTEM VARS FROM WCE ----------------- */ 
 
gen WCE_groups = systemgroups 
gen WCE_groupsl = log(systemgroups) 
 
 
replace systemgroups = 10 if systemgroups>10 
 
gen WCE_groups5peak=((systemgroups-5)^2*(-1)+25)*.04 
 
replace systemgroups = 5 if systemgroups>5 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by country: gen g1 = group 
by country: gen p1 = size 
 
by country: gen g2 = group[_n+1] 
by country: gen p2 = size[_n+1] 
 
by country: gen g3 = group[_n+2] 
by country: gen p3 = size[_n+2] 
 
by country: gen g4 = group[_n+3] 
by country: gen p4 = size[_n+3] 
 
by country: gen g5 = group[_n+4] 
by country: gen p5 = size[_n+4] 
 
by country: gen g6 = group[_n+5] 
by country: gen p6 = size[_n+5] 
 
by country: gen g7 = group[_n+6] 
by country: gen p7 = size[_n+6] 
 
by country: gen g8 = group[_n+7] 
by country: gen p8 = size[_n+7] 
 
by country: gen g9 = group[_n+8] 
by country: gen p9 = size[_n+8] 
 
by country: gen g10 = group[_n+9] 
by country: gen p10 = size[_n+9] 
 
by country: gen g11 = group[_n+10] 
by country: gen p11 = size[_n+10] 
 
 
replace p1 = 0 if missing(p1) 
replace p2 = 0 if missing(p2) 
replace p3 = 0 if missing(p3) 
replace p4 = 0 if missing(p4) 
replace p5 = 0 if missing(p5) 
replace p6 = 0 if missing(p6) 
replace p7 = 0 if missing(p7) 
replace p8 = 0 if missing(p8) 
replace p9 = 0 if missing(p9) 
replace p10 = 0 if missing(p10) 
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replace p11 = 0 if missing(p11) 
 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
gen bal=p2/p1 
 
gen balclass = "H" 
replace balclass = "D" if bal>=.33 & bal<.66 
replace balclass = "B" if bal>=.66 
replace balclass = "M" if p1>=.9 
 
 
gen groupclass = 0 
replace groupclass = 1 if systemgroups==2 
replace groupclass = 2 if systemgroups>=3 & systemgroups<=5 
replace groupclass = 3 if systemgroups>=6 
 
 
 
gen WCE_balance =(((bal-.25)*(bal-.15)*(.75-bal))+.15)/.18 
 
 
gen WCE_ethdom45 = 0 
replace WCE_ethdom45 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace WCE_ethdom45 = 0 if p1<=.45 
 
gen WCE_ethdom55 = 0 
replace WCE_ethdom55 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace WCE_ethdom55 = 0 if p1<=.55 
 
 
move systemgroups country 
rename size largestgroup 
move largestgroup country 
 
gsort +country 
 
egen WCE_system = concat(balclass groupclass) 
 
 
gsort +country 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
rename p1 WCE_p1 
rename p2 WCE_p2 
rename bal WCE_bal 
 
replace gwno = 678 if gwno == 679 
 
save "WCE2005_temp_full.dta", replace 
 
keep gwno WCE_p1 WCE_p2 WCE_bal WCE_system WCE_bipol WCE_groups WCE_groupsl 
WCE_ethdom45 WCE_ethdom55  WCE_ethpol WCE_ethfrac WCE_balance 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
 
save "WCE2005_temp.dta", replace 
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/* ---------------- MERGING INTO PRIO-onsets ----------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +gwno 
merge gwno using "WCE2005_temp.dta", update 
 
drop _merge 
drop if missing(year) 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING WCE by culture ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
 
use "WCE2005_full.dta", clear 
save "WCEc2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
replace country = "Antigua and Barbuda" if country == "Antigua" 
replace country = "British Virgin Islands" if country == "British Virgin 
Is" 
replace country = "Central African Republic" if country == "Central African 
Rep" 
replace country = "Congo, Republic of the" if country == "Congo" 
replace country = "Congo, Democratic Republic of" if country == "DR Congo" 
replace country = "Cote d'Ivoire" if country == "Ivory Coast" 
replace country = "Micronesia, Federated States of" if country == 
"Micronesia" 
replace country = "Myanmar (Burma)" if country == "Myanmar" 
replace country = "Korea, North" if country == "North Korea" 
replace country = "Korea, South" if country == "South Korea" 
replace country = "United Kingdom" if country == "Britain" 
replace country = "Vatican City" if country == "Holy See" 
replace country = "Malvinas" if country == "Falkland Islands" 
replace country = "Northern Mariana Islands" if country == "Northern 
Mariana Is" 
replace country = "Cyprus" if country == "Northern Cyprus" 
replace country = "Saint Kitts and Nevis" if country == "Saint Kitts & 
Nevis" 
replace country = "Saint Pierre and Miquelon" if country == "Saint Pierre & 
Miquelon" 
replace country = "St Vincent and Grenadines" if country == "Saint Vincent" 
replace country = "Sao Tome and Principe" if country == "São Tomé & 
Príncipe" 
replace country = "Timor Leste" if country == "Timor" 
replace country = "Trinidad and Tobago" if country == "Trinidad & Tobago" 
replace country = "Turks and Caicos Islands" if country == "Turks & Caicos 
Is" 
replace country = "Virgin Islands (U.S.)" if country == "Virgin Is of the 
US" 
replace country = "West Sahara" if country == "Sahara" 
replace country = "Wallis Futuna Islands" if country == "Wallis Futuna Is" 
 
kountry country, from(other) stuck 
drop if missing(_ISO3N_) 
sort _ISO3N_ 
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drop country 
rename NAMES_STD country 
rename _ISO3N_ iso3n 
 
kountry iso3n, from(iso3n) to(cown) 
rename _COWN_ gwno 
 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
/* -------- ADDING ETHPOL byCULTURE VARIABLE (INDEPENDENT) ------------ */ 
 
save "WCEc2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
rename pop_2005 pop2005 
keep country gwno culture pop2005 
 
gsort +country +culture 
 
by country culture: egen cult_total = total(pop2005) 
move cult_total pop2005 
 
gsort +country -cult_total 
by country culture, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
by country: egen totpop = total(cult_total) 
gen size = (cult_total/totpop) 
 
rename culture group 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*size*(1-size) 
by country: egen WCEc_ethpol = total(sizeSQ*4) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*(1-size) 
by country: egen WCEc_ethfrac = total(sizeSQ) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
drop if missing(gwno) 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by size, sort: keep if size > .01 
 
by country, sort: egen systemgroups=count(size) 
 
 
/* ---------------- MAKING SYSTEM VARS FROM WCEc ----------------- */ 
 
gen WCEc_groups = systemgroups 
gen WCEc_groupsl = log(systemgroups) 
 
replace systemgroups = 10 if systemgroups>10 
 
gen WCEc_groups5peak=((systemgroups-5)^2*(-1)+25)*.04 
 
replace systemgroups = 5 if systemgroups>5 
 
gsort +country -size 
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by country: gen g1 = group 
by country: gen p1 = size 
 
by country: gen g2 = group[_n+1] 
by country: gen p2 = size[_n+1] 
 
by country: gen g3 = group[_n+2] 
by country: gen p3 = size[_n+2] 
 
by country: gen g4 = group[_n+3] 
by country: gen p4 = size[_n+3] 
 
by country: gen g5 = group[_n+4] 
by country: gen p5 = size[_n+4] 
 
by country: gen g6 = group[_n+5] 
by country: gen p6 = size[_n+5] 
 
by country: gen g7 = group[_n+6] 
by country: gen p7 = size[_n+6] 
 
by country: gen g8 = group[_n+7] 
by country: gen p8 = size[_n+7] 
 
by country: gen g9 = group[_n+8] 
by country: gen p9 = size[_n+8] 
 
by country: gen g10 = group[_n+9] 
by country: gen p10 = size[_n+9] 
 
by country: gen g11 = group[_n+10] 
by country: gen p11 = size[_n+10] 
 
replace p1 = 0 if missing(p1) 
replace p2 = 0 if missing(p2) 
replace p3 = 0 if missing(p3) 
replace p4 = 0 if missing(p4) 
replace p5 = 0 if missing(p5) 
replace p6 = 0 if missing(p6) 
replace p7 = 0 if missing(p7) 
replace p8 = 0 if missing(p8) 
replace p9 = 0 if missing(p9) 
replace p10 = 0 if missing(p10) 
replace p11 = 0 if missing(p11) 
 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
gen bal=p2/p1 
 
gen balclass = "H" 
replace balclass = "D" if bal>=.33 & bal<.66 
replace balclass = "B" if bal>=.66 
replace balclass = "M" if p1>=.9 
 
 
gen groupclass = 0 
replace groupclass = 1 if systemgroups==2 
replace groupclass = 2 if systemgroups>=3 & systemgroups<=5 
replace groupclass = 3 if systemgroups>=6 
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gen WCEc_balance =(((bal-.25)*(bal-.15)*(.75-bal))+.15)/.18 
 
 
 
gen WCEc_ethdom45 = 0 
replace WCEc_ethdom45 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace WCEc_ethdom45 = 0 if p1<=.45 
 
gen WCEc_ethdom55 = 0 
replace WCEc_ethdom55 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace WCEc_ethdom55 = 0 if p1<=.55 
 
 
move systemgroups country 
rename size largestgroup 
move largestgroup country 
 
gsort +country 
 
egen WCEc_system = concat(balclass groupclass) 
 
 
gsort +country 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
 
rename p1 WCEc_p1 
rename p2 WCEc_p2 
rename bal WCEc_bal 
 
replace gwno = 678 if gwno == 679 
 
save "WCEc2005_temp_full.dta", replace 
 
keep gwno WCEc_p1 WCEc_p2 WCEc_bal WCEc_system WCEc_bipol WCEc_groups 
WCEc_groupsl WCEc_ethdom45 WCEc_ethdom55 WCEc_balance WCEc_ethpol 
WCEc_ethfrac 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
 
save "WCEc2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------- MERGING INTO PRIO-onsets ----------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +gwno 
merge gwno using "WCEc2005_temp.dta", update 
 
drop _merge 
drop if missing(year) 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING ANM (by GREG) ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
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use "ANMGREG.dta", clear 
save "ANMGREG_temp.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ------ ADDING ETHPOL byGROUP VARIABLE (INDEPENDENT) ----------------- */ 
 
rename shortname group 
rename cowcode gwno 
 
drop if gwno == "n.a." 
drop if gwno == "GL" 
drop if country == "Korea (North and South)" 
 
 
destring gwno, replace 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
keep country gwno group size 
 
gsort +country +group 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*size*(1-size) 
by country: egen ANM_ethpol = total(sizeSQ*4) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*(1-size) 
by country: egen ANM_ethfrac = total(sizeSQ) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
drop if missing(gwno) 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by size, sort: keep if size > .01 
 
by country, sort: egen systemgroups=count(size) 
 
 
/* ---------------- MAKING SYSTEM VARS FROM ANM ----------------- */ 
 
gen ANM_groups = systemgroups 
gen ANM_groupsl = log(systemgroups) 
 
replace systemgroups = 10 if systemgroups>10 
 
gen ANM_groups5peak =((systemgroups-5)^2*(-1)+25)*.04 
 
replace systemgroups = 5 if systemgroups>5 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by country: gen g1 = group 
by country: gen p1 = size 
 
by country: gen g2 = group[_n+1] 
by country: gen p2 = size[_n+1] 
 
by country: gen g3 = group[_n+2] 
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by country: gen p3 = size[_n+2] 
 
by country: gen g4 = group[_n+3] 
by country: gen p4 = size[_n+3] 
 
by country: gen g5 = group[_n+4] 
by country: gen p5 = size[_n+4] 
 
by country: gen g6 = group[_n+5] 
by country: gen p6 = size[_n+5] 
 
by country: gen g7 = group[_n+6] 
by country: gen p7 = size[_n+6] 
 
by country: gen g8 = group[_n+7] 
by country: gen p8 = size[_n+7] 
 
by country: gen g9 = group[_n+8] 
by country: gen p9 = size[_n+8] 
 
by country: gen g10 = group[_n+9] 
by country: gen p10 = size[_n+9] 
 
by country: gen g11 = group[_n+10] 
by country: gen p11 = size[_n+10] 
 
 
replace p1 = 0 if missing(p1) 
replace p2 = 0 if missing(p2) 
replace p3 = 0 if missing(p3) 
replace p4 = 0 if missing(p4) 
replace p5 = 0 if missing(p5) 
replace p6 = 0 if missing(p6) 
replace p7 = 0 if missing(p7) 
replace p8 = 0 if missing(p8) 
replace p9 = 0 if missing(p9) 
replace p10 = 0 if missing(p10) 
replace p11 = 0 if missing(p11) 
 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
gen bal=p2/p1 
 
gen balclass = "H" 
replace balclass = "D" if bal>=.33 & bal<.66 
replace balclass = "B" if bal>=.66 
replace balclass = "M" if p1>=.9 
 
 
gen groupclass = 0 
replace groupclass = 1 if systemgroups==2 
replace groupclass = 2 if systemgroups>=3 & systemgroups<=5 
replace groupclass = 3 if systemgroups>=6 
 
gen ANM_balance =(((bal-.25)*(bal-.15)*(.75-bal))+.15)/.18 
 
 
gen ANM_ethdom45 = 0 
replace ANM_ethdom45 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace ANM_ethdom45 = 0 if p1<=.45 
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gen ANM_ethdom55 = 0 
replace ANM_ethdom55 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace ANM_ethdom55 = 0 if p1<=.55 
 
 
move systemgroups country 
rename size largestgroup 
move largestgroup country 
 
gsort +country 
 
egen ANM_system = concat(balclass groupclass) 
 
gsort +country 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
save "ANMGREG_temp_full.dta", replace 
 
rename p1 ANM_p1 
rename p2 ANM_p2 
rename bal ANM_bal 
 
 
keep gwno ANM_p1 ANM_p2 ANM_bal ANM_system ANM_bipol ANM_groups ANM_groupsl 
ANM_ethdom45 ANM_ethdom55 ANM_ethpol ANM_ethfrac ANM_balance 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
save "ANM2005_temp.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------- MERGING INTO COUNTRYYEAR_EGIP ----------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +gwno +year 
merge gwno using "ANM2005_temp.dta", update 
 
drop _merge 
gsort +gwno +year 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING JOSHUA (by GREG) ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
 
use "JOSHUA.dta", clear 
save "JOSHUA_temp.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ------ ADDING ETHPOL byGROUP VARIABLE (INDEPENDENT) ----------------- */ 
 
rename peopnameacrosscountries group 
 
kountry iso3, from(iso3c) to(cown) 
rename _COWN_ gwno 
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drop if missing(gwno) 
replace gwno = 580 if gwno == 511 
replace gwno = 260 if gwno == 255 | gwno == 265 
replace gwno = 530 if gwno == 529 
 
keep country gwno group population 
 
gsort +country +group 
 
by country: egen total = total(population) 
 
gen size = (population/total) 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*size*(1-size) 
by country: egen JOSHUA_ethpol = total(sizeSQ*4) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
gen sizeSQ=size*(1-size) 
by country: egen JOSHUA_ethfrac = total(sizeSQ) 
drop sizeSQ 
 
drop if missing(gwno) 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by size, sort: keep if size > .01 
 
by country, sort: egen systemgroups=count(size) 
 
 
/* ---------------- MAKING SYSTEM VARS FROM JOSHUA ----------------- */ 
 
gen JOSHUA_groups = systemgroups 
gen JOSHUA_groupsl = log(systemgroups) 
 
replace systemgroups = 10 if systemgroups>10 
 
gen JOSHUA_groups5peak =((systemgroups-5)^2*(-1)+25)*.04 
 
replace systemgroups = 5 if systemgroups>5 
 
gsort +country -size 
 
by country: gen g1 = group 
by country: gen p1 = size 
 
by country: gen g2 = group[_n+1] 
by country: gen p2 = size[_n+1] 
 
by country: gen g3 = group[_n+2] 
by country: gen p3 = size[_n+2] 
 
by country: gen g4 = group[_n+3] 
by country: gen p4 = size[_n+3] 
 
by country: gen g5 = group[_n+4] 
by country: gen p5 = size[_n+4] 
 
by country: gen g6 = group[_n+5] 
by country: gen p6 = size[_n+5] 
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by country: gen g7 = group[_n+6] 
by country: gen p7 = size[_n+6] 
 
by country: gen g8 = group[_n+7] 
by country: gen p8 = size[_n+7] 
 
by country: gen g9 = group[_n+8] 
by country: gen p9 = size[_n+8] 
 
by country: gen g10 = group[_n+9] 
by country: gen p10 = size[_n+9] 
 
by country: gen g11 = group[_n+10] 
by country: gen p11 = size[_n+10] 
 
 
replace p1 = 0 if missing(p1) 
replace p2 = 0 if missing(p2) 
replace p3 = 0 if missing(p3) 
replace p4 = 0 if missing(p4) 
replace p5 = 0 if missing(p5) 
replace p6 = 0 if missing(p6) 
replace p7 = 0 if missing(p7) 
replace p8 = 0 if missing(p8) 
replace p9 = 0 if missing(p9) 
replace p10 = 0 if missing(p10) 
replace p11 = 0 if missing(p11) 
 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
gen bal=p2/p1 
 
gen balclass = "H" 
replace balclass = "D" if bal>=.33 & bal<.66 
replace balclass = "B" if bal>=.66 
replace balclass = "M" if p1>=.9 
 
 
gen groupclass = 0 
replace groupclass = 1 if systemgroups==2 
replace groupclass = 2 if systemgroups>=3 & systemgroups<=5 
replace groupclass = 3 if systemgroups>=6 
 
gen JOSHUA_balance =(((bal-.25)*(bal-.15)*(.75-bal))+.15)/.18 
 
 
gen JOSHUA_ethdom45 = 0 
replace JOSHUA_ethdom45 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace JOSHUA_ethdom45 = 0 if p1<=.45 
 
gen JOSHUA_ethdom55 = 0 
replace JOSHUA_ethdom55 = 1 if p1<=.9 
replace JOSHUA_ethdom55 = 0 if p1<=.55 
 
 
move systemgroups country 
rename size largestgroup 
move largestgroup country 
 
gsort +country 
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egen JOSHUA_system = concat(balclass groupclass) 
 
 
gsort +country 
 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 1 
 
save "JOSHUA_temp_full.dta", replace 
 
rename p1 JOSHUA_p1 
rename p2 JOSHUA_p2 
rename bal JOSHUA_bal 
 
keep gwno JOSHUA_p1 JOSHUA_p2 JOSHUA_bal JOSHUA_system JOSHUA_bipol 
JOSHUA_groups JOSHUA_groupsl JOSHUA_ethdom45 JOSHUA_ethdom55 JOSHUA_ethpol 
JOSHUA_ethfrac  
 
JOSHUA_balance 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
save "JOSHUA_temp.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------- MERGING INTO COUNTRYYEAR_EGIP ----------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +gwno +year 
merge gwno using "JOSHUA_temp.dta", update 
 
drop _merge 
gsort +gwno +year 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
 
 
/* -----PREPARING VARS FROM 'DRIVING DEMOCRACY' DBASE ----------------- */ 
/* ------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
use "driving_dem.dta", clear 
save "temp_demdev.dta", replace 
 
egen yearc = concat(gwno Year) 
destring yearc, replace 
 
generate demsq = Polity1^2 
replace demsq = . if demsq>101 
 
rename INST inst 
rename Watts2 fed 
rename elecfam04 elecsys 
rename Polity1 democracy 
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label var demsq "Democracy index squared, calc from Polity1 in Driving 
Democracy dataset" 
label var inst "Institution, (INST) from Driving Democracy dataset" 
label var fed "Watts2 definition in EGIP dataset" 
 
keep yearc demsq inst fed elecsys democracy 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "temp_demdev.dta", replace 
 
/* ------------ MERGING DEM & INST -------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
merge yearc using "temp_demdev.dta", update 
 
 
drop _merge 
duplicates drop 
 
gsort +country +year 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ------- PREPARING REGIONS VARIABLE FROM 'DRIVING DEM' ------------- */ 
 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
use "driving_dem.dta", clear 
save "temp2_demdev.dta", replace 
 
 
rename Region8 region8 
rename Africa africa 
rename Asia asia 
rename CEurope ceurope 
rename Nam nam 
rename Sam sam 
rename Scan scan 
rename MEast meast 
rename WEuro weuro 
 
keep gwno region8 africa asia ceurope nam sam scan meast weuro 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
save "temp2_demdev.dta", replace 
 
/* ------------ MERGING REGIONS -------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +gwno 
 
merge gwno using "temp2_demdev.dta", update 
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drop _merge 
 
gsort +country +year 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
 
/* ------PREPARING LPOP & LGDPC VARIABLEs FROM WDI DBASE -------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- --------------------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- --------------------------- */ 
 
use "wdi.dta", clear 
save "wdi_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
egen yearc = concat(gwno Year) 
destring yearc, replace 
 
gen lgdpc = log(GDPCap) 
gen lgdp_ppp = log(GDP_ppp) 
gen lpop = log(Pop_total) 
 
label var lgdpc "Log of GDP per capita, calc from WDI dataset" 
label var lgdp_ppp "Log of total GDP in Purchasing Power Parity, calc from 
WDI dataset" 
label var lpop "Log of total population, calc from WDI dataset" 
 
keep yearc lgdpc lgdp_ppp lpop 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "wdi_TEMP.dta", replace 
 
/* ------------ MERGING DEM & INST -------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
merge yearc using "wdi_TEMP.dta", update 
 
 
drop _merge 
 
 
replace region8 = 2 if country == "Republic of Vietnam" 
replace region8 = 4 if country == "Yemen Arab Republic" 
replace region8 = 3 if country == "Czechoslovakia" 
replace region8 = 2 if country == "Vietnam" 
 
 
drop if missing(country) 
drop if missing(gwno) 
duplicates drop 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
gen coldwar = 0 
replace coldwar = 1 if year<1990 
 
gsort +yearc 
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save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
/* ---------------- ADDING EPR CONFLICT DATA ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ------------------------ ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ------------------------ ----------------- */ 
 
 
clear 
set memory 200m 
 
use "EPR\EPR_EAC.dta", clear 
save "EPR_EAC_temp.dta", replace 
 
replace cowcode = 260 if cowcode == 255 
egen yearc = concat(cowcode year) 
destring yearc, replace 
move yearc country 
 
gen EPR_p1 = . 
replace EPR_p1 = .99 if ethrelevant == 1 
 
gen EPR_p2 = . 
replace EPR_p2 = .01 if ethrelevant == 1 
 
gen EPR_system = "M1" if ethrelevant == 1 
gen EPR_bal = 1/99 
local c=.4 
gen EPR_balance4 =(-(.01/.99-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.5 
gen EPR_balance5 =(-(.01/.99-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
local c=.6 
gen EPR_balance6 =(-(.01/.99-`c')^2)/(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2+1 
gen EPR_groups = 2 
gen EPR_groupsl = log(2) 
gen EPR_interops = 1 
gen EPR_order = 0 
gen EPR_ethpol = 4*( (.99*.99*(1-.99)) + (.01*.01*(1-.01))) 
gen EPR_ethfrac = (.99*(1-.99)) + (.01*(1-.01)) 
gen EPR_ethdom45 = 0 
 
keep country EPR_ethdom45 EPR_p1 EPR_p2 EPR_system EPR_bal EPR_balance4 
EPR_balance5 EPR_balance6 EPR_groups EPR_groupsl EPR_interops EPR_order 
EPR_ethpol EPR_ethfrac /// 
yearc lpopl gdpcapl newethwartype2 newonset newonset2 newethonset2 
newseconset newhionset2 newethhionset2 newethwartype /// 
newethintensity onsetfl2 ongoingdrop ethonsetfl2 oilpc anocl democl regchg3 
lmtnest npeaceyears ethrelevant 
 
 
rename lpopl EPR_lpopl  
rename gdpcapl EPR_gdpcapl 
rename ongoingdrop EPR_ongoingdrop 
rename newonset2 EPR_newonset2 
rename newhionset2 EPR_newhionset2 
rename newethonset2 EPR_newethonset2  
rename newseconset EPR_newseconset 
rename newethhionset2 EPR_newethhionset2  
rename onsetfl2 EPR_onsetfl2  
rename ethonsetfl2 EPR_ethonsetfl2  
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rename oilpc EPR_oilpc  
rename newethintensity EPR_newethintensity 
rename anocl EPR_anocl 
rename democl EPR_democl 
rename regchg3 EPR_regchg3 
rename lmtnest EPR_lmtnest 
rename npeaceyears EPR_npeaceyears 
rename newethwartype EPR_newethwartype 
rename newethwartype2 EPR_newethwartype2 
rename ethrelevant EPR_ethrelevant 
 
replace EPR_newethwartype2 = 2 if EPR_newethwartype2 == 3 
 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
save "EPR_EAC_temp.dta", replace 
 
clear 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
gsort +yearc 
 
merge yearc using "EPR_EAC_temp.dta", update 
 
drop if missing(gwno) 
drop _merge 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
 
/* -------FINAL TOUCH-UP OF VARBIABLES ---------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
/* ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- */ 
 
 
gen EPR_balxorder = EPR_bal*EPR_order 
gen EPR_groupsxorder = EPR_groups*EPR_order 
 
gen WCE_order = 1-WCE_p1-WCE_p2 
gen WCE_balxorder = WCE_bal*WCE_order 
 
gen WCEc_order = 1-WCEc_p1-WCEc_p2 
gen WCEc_balxorder = WCEc_bal*WCEc_order 
gen ANM_order = 1-ANM_p1-ANM_p2 
gen ANM_balxorder = ANM_bal*ANM_order 
 
gen JOSHUA_order = 1-JOSHUA_p1-JOSHUA_p2 
gen JOSHUA_balxorder = JOSHUA_bal*JOSHUA_order 
 
gen SNLEBCC_order = 1-SNLEBCC_p1-SNLEBCC_p2 
gen SNLEBCC_balxorder = SNLEBCC_bal*SNLEBCC_order 
 
local c=.4 
gen WCE_balance4=(-(WCE_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen WCEc_balance4=(-(WCEc_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen ANM_balance4=(-(ANM_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen JOSHUA_balance4=(-(JOSHUA_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen SNLEBCC_balance4=(-(SNLEBCC_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
 
/*------------------ ADDING LABELS--------------------*/ 
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label var EPR_npeaceyears "Years since last war" 
label var EPR_gdpcapl "GDP per capita, lagged" 
label var EPR_lpopl "Ln(Population), lagged" 
label var EPR_oilpc "Oil production per capita" 
label var EPR_anoc "Anocracy, dummy" 
label var EPR_regchg3 "Political instability" 
label var EPR_lmtnest "Ln(Mountains)" 
label var EPR_groups "Groups" 
label var EPR_order "Fragmentation(1-g1-g2)" 
label var EPR_groupsl "Ln(Groups) 
label var EPR_interops "Interaction Opportunities" 
label var EPR_npeaceyears "Years since last war" 
label var EPR_gdpcapl "GDP per capita, lagged" 
label var EPR_lpopl "Ln(Population), lagged" 
label var EPR_oilpc "Oil production per capita" 
label var EPR_anoc "Anocracy, dummy" 
label var EPR_regchg3 "Political instability" 
label var EPR_lmtnest "Ln(Mountains)" 
label var EPR_groups "Groups" 
label var EPR_groupsl "Ln(Groups) 
label var EPR_interops "Interaction Opportunities" 
label var EPR_bal "Balance (g2/g1)" 
label var EPR_balance1 "Dominance (1/10 peak)"  
label var EPR_balance2 "Dominance (2/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance3 "Dominance (3/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance4 "Dominance (4/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance5 "Dominance (5/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance6 "Dominance (6/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance7 "Dominance (7/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance8 "Dominance (8/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance9 "Dominance (9/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_balance10 "Dominance (10/10 peak)" 
label var EPR_ethpol "Ethnic polarization" 
label var EPR_ethfrac "Ethnic fractionalization" 
label var EPR_ethheg70 "Hegemony, two-group" 
label var EPR_multiheg "Hegemony, multigroup" 
label var EPR_B5xGl "Ln(Groups)*Dominance(5/10)" 
label var EPR_bal4xorder "Fragm.*Dominance(4/10)" 
label var EPR_bal5xorder "Fragm.*Dominance(5/10)" 
 
drop if gwno == 571 
 
save "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", replace 
 
/* --------- CREATING COUNTRIES DATABASE FOR YEAR 2000 --- */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------- */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------- */ 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
save "TGRH_countries_priobased.dta", replace 
 
gsort +country +year 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_cwtot = total(PRIO_cw) 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_25tot = total(PRIO_25) 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_1000tot = total(PRIO_1000) 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_terrtot = total(PRIO_terr) 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_govtot = total(PRIO_gov) 
by country, sort: egen PRIO_incompmed = median(PRIO_incomp) 
by country, sort: egen SCW_onsettot = total(SCW_onset) 
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by country, sort: egen EPR_newonset2tot = total(EPR_newonset2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_newhionset2tot = total(EPR_newhionset2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_newethonset2tot = total(EPR_newethonset2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_newseconsettot = total(EPR_newseconset) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_newethhionset2tot = total(EPR_newethhionset2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_onsetfl2tot = total(EPR_onsetfl2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_ethonsetfl2tot = total(EPR_ethonsetfl2) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_newethwartype2max = max(EPR_newethwartype2) 
 
by country, sort: egen EPR_multipol3max = max(EPR_multipol3) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_multipol4max = max(EPR_multipol4) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_multipol5max = max(EPR_multipol5) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_multipol6max = max(EPR_multipol6) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_lmultipol3max = max(EPR_lmultipol3) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_lmultipol4max = max(EPR_lmultipol4) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_lmultipol5max = max(EPR_lmultipol5) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_lmultipol6max = max(EPR_lmultipol6) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_ethdom45mean = mean(EPR_ethdom45) 
by country, sort: egen EPR_ethdom55mean = mean(EPR_ethdom55) 
 
by country, sort: egen instmedian = median(inst) 
by country, sort: egen elecsysmedian = median(elecsys) 
by country, sort: egen fedmedian = median(fed) 
by country, sort: egen demsqmedian = median(demsq) 
by country, sort: egen lgdpcmean = mean(lgdpc) 
by country, sort: egen lgdp_pppmean = mean(lgdp_ppp) 
by country, sort: egen lpopmean = mean(lpop) 
 
by country, sort: egen ANM_ethfracmean = mean(ANM_ethfrac) 
by country, sort: egen ncontigmed = median(ncontig) 
by country, sort: egen lnmtnmean = mean(lnmtn) 
by country, sort: egen region8med = median(region8) 
 
by country, sort: egen africamed = median(africa) 
by country, sort: egen asiamed = median(asia) 
by country, sort: egen ceuropemed = median(ceurope) 
by country, sort: egen sammed = median(sam) 
by country, sort: egen nammed = median(nam) 
by country, sort: egen scanmed = median(scan) 
by country, sort: egen meastmed = median(meast) 
by country, sort: egen weuromed = median(weuro) 
 
replace PRIO_incompmed = 0 if missing(PRIO_incompmed) 
 
gsort +country -year 
by country, sort: keep if _n == 5 
 
 
gen PRIO_cwdum = 0 
replace PRIO_cwdum = 1 if PRIO_cwtot>=1 | PRIO_25tot>=1 
replace PRIO_incompmed = 0 if PRIO_cwdum==0 
 
gen EPR_ethwardummy = 0 
replace EPR_ethwardummy = 1 if EPR_newethonset2tot>=1 
 
gen EPR_ethterrdummy = 0 
replace EPR_ethterrdummy = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2max==1 
 
gen EPR_ethgovdummy = 0 
replace EPR_ethgovdummy = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2max==2 
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label var PRIO_incompmed "1=Territory, 2=Government, 3=Both" 
 
 
gsort +country 
 
save "TGRH_countries_priobased.dta", replace 
 
/* ---------------- PREPARING TABLE FOR COUNTRY COMPARISON ------------ */ 
 
keep  country stateabb EPR_system PRIO_cwtot EPR_ethwardummy 
EPR_newethonset2tot EPR_ethgovdummy EPR_ethterrdummy gwno 
 
save "TGRH_SYSTEM_comparisons_with-war-defs.dta", replace 
 
 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 1 -------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
 
eststo clear 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups EPR_groupsl 
EPR_interops EPR_order  
 
EPR_ethfrac EPR_ethpol, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groupsl, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_interops, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_ethfrac, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_anocl EPR_oilpc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_ethpol, cluster(country) 
 
esttab using "TABLE1_whether-groups-matter.rtf", replace se unstack onecell 
label nogaps nomtitles compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-likelihood") /// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset. ") /// 
title("TABLE 1: Logistic regressions on ethnic conflict onsets: The effect 
of fragmentation") 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 2 -------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
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clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
 
 
eststo clear 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_bal, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance4 , 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5 , 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance6 , 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_dominant, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_ethdom45, 
cluster(country) 
 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5 
EPR_bal5xorder, cluster 
 
(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_balance5 if EPR_groups==2, 
cluster(country) 
 
esttab using "TABLE2_whether-balance-matters.rtf", replace se unstack 
onecell nogaps nonotes compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-likelihood") /// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset.") /// 
title("TABLE 2: Logistic regressions on ethnic conflict onsets: The effect 
of Balance") 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 3 -------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
 
replace EPR_newethwartype2 = 0 if EPR_newethonset2 == 0 
 
gen EPR_balanced = . 
replace EPR_balanced = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_balanced = 1 if EPR_bal>=.75 
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gen EPR_hegemonic = . 
replace EPR_hegemonic = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_hegemonic = 1 if EPR_bal<=.25 
 
gen EPR_dominant = . 
replace EPR_dominant = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_dominant = 1 if EPR_bal>=.25 & EPR_bal<=.75 
 
label var EPR_dominant "Dominant system(dummy)" 
label var EPR_balanced "Balanced system(dummy)" 
label var EPR_hegemonic "Hegemonic system(dummy)" 
 
gen EPR_terronset = 0 
replace EPR_terronset = . if missing(EPR_newethonset2) 
replace EPR_terronset = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2 == 1 
 
gen EPR_govonset = 0 
replace EPR_govonset = . if missing(EPR_newethonset2) 
replace EPR_govonset = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2 == 2 | EPR_newethwartype2 == 
3 
 
gen EPR_autocl = . 
replace EPR_autocl = 1 if EPR_democl==0 | EPR_anocl==0 
replace EPR_autocl = 0 if EPR_democl==1 | EPR_anocl==1 
 
 
 
eststo clear 
 
 
eststo: logit EPR_terronset EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups EPR_balance5, cluster(country) 
estadd ysumm, sum 
eststo: logit EPR_govonset EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups EPR_bal , cluster(country) 
estadd ysumm, sum 
eststo: mlogit EPR_newethwartype2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups EPR_balance5 , 
cluster(country) 
estadd ysumm, sum 
eststo: mlogit EPR_newethwartype2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anocl EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_groups EPR_bal , 
cluster(country) 
estadd ysumm, sum 
 
 
esttab using "TABLE3_territory-government.rtf", replace se unstack onecell 
label nogaps nonotes compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-likelihood" "N_clust 
Countries" "ysum  
 
Total onsets") /// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset. ") /// 
mtitles("Territory" "Government" "Binominal 1" "Binominal 2") /// 
title("Table 3: Logistic and binominal regressions on territorial and 
government onsets") 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 3b ------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
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clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use " TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
drop if EPR_p1 >= .99  
 
replace EPR_newethwartype2 = 0 if EPR_newethonset2 == 0 
 
gen EPR_balanced = . 
replace EPR_balanced = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_balanced = 1 if EPR_bal>=.75 
 
gen EPR_hegemonic = . 
replace EPR_hegemonic = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_hegemonic = 1 if EPR_bal<=.25 
 
gen EPR_dominant = . 
replace EPR_dominant = 0 if EPR_bal<=1 
replace EPR_dominant = 1 if EPR_bal>=.25 & EPR_bal<=.75 
 
label var EPR_dominant "Dominant system(dummy)" 
label var EPR_balanced "Balanced system(dummy)" 
label var EPR_hegemonic "Hegemonic system(dummy)" 
 
gen EPR_terronset = 0 
replace EPR_terronset = . if missing(EPR_newethonset2) 
replace EPR_terronset = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2 == 1 
 
gen EPR_govonset = 0 
replace EPR_govonset = . if missing(EPR_newethonset2) 
replace EPR_govonset = 1 if EPR_newethwartype2 == 2 | EPR_newethwartype2 == 
3 
 
gen EPR_autocl = . 
replace EPR_autocl = 1 if EPR_democl==0 | EPR_anocl==0 
replace EPR_autocl = 0 if EPR_democl==1 | EPR_anocl==1 
 
 
eststo clear 
 
 
eststo: logit EPR_anocl EPR_order EPR_bal EPR_balance5 EPR_gdpcapl 
EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc EPR_lmtnest, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_democl EPR_order EPR_bal EPR_balance5 EPR_gdpcapl 
EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc EPR_lmtnest, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_autocl EPR_order EPR_bal EPR_balance5 EPR_gdpcapl 
EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc EPR_lmtnest, cluster(country) 
 
esttab using "TABLE3b_quality-of-government.rtf", replace se unstack 
onecell label nogaps nonotes compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-likelihood" 
"N_clust Countries" "ysum Total onsets") /// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset. ") /// 
mtitles("Anocracy" "Democracy" "Autocracy") /// 
title("Table 3b: Logistic regressions on form of government") 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 4 -------------------------------------*/ 
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*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
eststo clear 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethhionset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_ethonsetfl2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit onset5 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_onsetfl2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, cluster(country) 
eststo: logit SCW_onset EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl EPR_oilpc 
EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, cluster(country) 
 
 
esttab using "TABLE4_different-dep-vars.rtf", replace se unstack onecell 
label nogaps nonotes nomtitles compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-likelihood") 
/// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis.") /// 
title("TABLE 4: Logistic regressions on different dependent variables") 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLE 5 -------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
 
local c=.5 
gen WCE_balance5=(-(WCE_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen WCEc_balance5=(-(WCEc_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen ANM_balance5=(-(ANM_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
gen JOSHUA_balance5=(-(JOSHUA_bal-`c')^2) /(sqrt((`c'-.5)^2)+.5)^2 +1 
 
eststo clear 
 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest EPR_order EPR_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
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eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest WCE_order WCE_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest WCEc_order WCEc_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest ANM_order ANM_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
eststo: logit EPR_newethonset2 EPR_npeaceyears EPR_gdpcapl EPR_lpopl 
EPR_oilpc EPR_anoc EPR_regchg3 EPR_lmtnest JOSHUA_order JOSHUA_balance5, 
cluster(country) 
 
esttab using "TABLE5_robustness_different-ethnic-datasets.rtf", replace se 
unstack onecell nogaps label nonotes compress pr2 aic sca("ll Log-
likelihood") /// 
addnotes("Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Based on the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset. Ethnic monopoly (g2/g1<1/10) excluded.") /// 
title("TABLE 5: Robustness across different ethnic datasets") 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ TABLES 6 & 7 -------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use " TGRH_countries_priobased.dta", clear 
 
drop if EPR_p1 >= .99 
 
gen frag_kvant = 1 
replace frag_kvant = 2 if EPR_order>=.071 
replace frag_kvant = 3 if EPR_order>=.314 
 
gen bal_kvant = 1 
replace bal_kvant = 2 if EPR_bal>=.25 
replace bal_kvant = 3 if EPR_bal>=.75 
 
table bal_kvant frag_kvant , row col scol 
 
gen group_kvant = 1 
replace group_kvant = 2 if EPR_groups>=3 
replace group_kvant = 3 if EPR_groups>=6 
 
table bal_kvant group_kvant , row col scol 
 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ FIGURES 7 & 8 -------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
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use "TGRH_countries_priobased.dta", clear 
 
replace EPR_groups = 10 if EPR_groups>10 
 
set scheme s1mono, perm 
 
gen stateabb_top = "" 
replace stateabb_top = stateabb if EPR_order>.6 
 
twoway (scatter EPR_order ANM_order, mlabel(stateabb_top) ytitle("EPR 
Fragmentation", height(7)) xtitle("ANM Fragmentation", height(7)) 
mlabposition(9) title("Figure 8: Fragmentation for EPR and ANM", 
placement(nw)))  
graph export EPR_frag-ANM_frag_distribution.png, replace 
 
replace stateabb_top = "" 
replace stateabb_top = stateabb if EPR_ethfrac>.7 
 
twoway (scatter EPR_ethfrac ANM_ethfrac, mlabel(stateabb_top) ytitle("EPR 
Fractionalization", height(7)) xtitle("ANM Fractionalization", height(7)) 
mlabposition(9) title("Figure 7: Fractionalization for EPR and ANM", 
placement(nw)))  
graph export EPR_frac-ANM_frac_distribution.png, replace 
 
 
 
 
*/------------------------ FIGURES 9 to 12 - PROBABILITIES --------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
drop if EPR_p1 >= .99 
 
*** FIGURE 2 
* means: fragmentation: .1732317  
* means: dominance(4): .7050623  
* means: balance: .294015  
* predicted probabilities (Model 3.1 and 3.2) 
 
 
gen pterr_dom= 1/(1+2.71^(-( /// 
-12.54 /// constant 
+(-0.00809*15.54) /// peaceyears 
+(-0.0519*6.056) /// GDP per capita 
+(0.570*9.20229) /// population 
+(0.0115*2.078) /// oil per capita 
+(1.022*0.2242) /// anocracy 
+(0.0487*0.1219) /// political instability 
+(-0.0302*2.2026) /// mountains 
+(1.110*0.173231) /// fragmentation 
+(2.240*EPR_balance4) /// DOMINANCE4 
))) 
 
gen pterr_frag= 1/(1+2.71^(-( /// 
-12.54 /// constant 
+(-0.00809*15.54) /// peaceyears 
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+(-0.0519*6.056) /// GDP per capita 
+(0.570*9.20229) /// population 
+(0.0115*2.078) /// oil per capita 
+(1.022*0.2242) /// anocracy 
+(0.0487*0.1219) /// political instability 
+(-0.0302*2.2026) /// mountains 
+(2.240*0.7050623) /// dominance 
+(1.110*EPR_order) /// FRAGMENTATION 
))) 
 
 
gen pgov_bal= 1/(1+2.71^(-( /// 
-5.518 /// constant 
+(0.0161*15.54) /// peaceyears 
+(-0.171*6.056) /// GDP per capita 
+(-0.0288*9.20229) /// population 
+(0.0409*2.078) /// oil per capita 
+(0.571*0.2242) /// anocracy 
+(0.391*0.1219) /// political instability 
+(0.0723*2.2026) /// mountains 
+(2.682*0.173231 ) /// fragmentation 
+(0.393*EPR_bal) /// BALANCE 
))) 
 
gen pgov_frag= 1/(1+2.71^(-( /// 
-5.518 /// constant 
+(0.0161*15.54) /// peaceyears 
+(-0.171*6.056) /// GDP per capita 
+(-0.0288*9.20229) /// population 
+(0.0409*2.078) /// oil per capita 
+(0.571*0.2242) /// anocracy 
+(0.391*0.1219) /// political instability 
+(0.0723*2.2026) /// mountains 
+(0.393*0.294015 ) /// balance 
+(2.682*EPR_order) /// FRAGMENTATION 
))) 
 
twoway (mband pterr_frag EPR_order, clcolor(gs4) clpat(solid)) , 
ytitle(p(territory conflict), size(large) height(7)) /// 
title("Figure 9: Probability of Territorial Conflict", placement(nw)) /// 
xtitle(Fragmentation, size(large) height(7)) scheme(s1mono) 
graph export Probabilities_TERR_frag.png, replace 
 
twoway (mband pterr_dom EPR_balance4, clcolor(gs4) clpat(solid)) , 
ytitle(p(territorial conflict), size(large) height(7)) /// 
title("Figure 10: Probability of Territorial Conflict", placement(nw)) /// 
xtitle(Dominance, size(large) height(7)) scheme(s1mono) 
graph export Probabilities_TERR_dom.png, replace 
 
twoway (mband pgov_frag EPR_order, clcolor(gs4) clpat(solid)) , 
ytitle(p(government conflict), size(large) height(7)) /// 
title("Figure 11: Probability of Government Conflict", placement(nw)) /// 
xtitle(Fragmentation, size(large) height(7)) scheme(s1mono) 
graph export Probabilities_GOV_frag.png, replace 
 
twoway (mband pgov_bal EPR_bal, clcolor(gs4) clpat(solid)) , 
ytitle(p(government conflict), size(large) height(7)) /// 
title("Figure 12: Probability of Government Conflict", placement(nw)) /// 
xtitle(Balance, size(large) height(7)) scheme(s1mono) 
graph export Probabilities_GOV_bal.png, replace 
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*/------------------------ FIGURES 11 & 12 - DISTRIBUTIONS --------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
*/----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
 
 
clear  
set memory 200m 
 
use "TGRH_countryyears_priobased.dta", clear 
 
keep if year == 2000 
 
drop if EPR_groups == 1 
replace EPR_groups = 10 if EPR_groups>10 
 
gen stateabb_top = "" 
replace stateabb_top = stateabb if EPR_order>.31 
replace stateabb_top = stateabb if EPR_bal>.75 & EPR_order>.01 
 
 
twoway (scatter EPR_bal EPR_order, mlabel(stateabb_top) ytitle("Balance", 
size(large) height(7)) ylabel(0(.25)1) xlabel(0(.2)1) 
xtitle("Fragmentation", size(large) height(7)) /// 
xscale(range(0 1)) xline(.07 .31, lpattern(dash)) yline(.25 .75, 
lpattern(dash)) mlabposition(3) title("Figure 11: Distribution of Countries 
by Fragmentation", placement(nw)))  
graph export distribution_bal-frag.png, replace 
 
twoway (scatter EPR_bal EPR_groups, mlabel(stateabb_top) ytitle("Balance", 
size(large) height(7)) ylabel(0(.25)1) xlabel(2(1)10) xtitle("Groups", 
size(large) height(7)) /// 
xscale(range(1 11)) xline(2.5 5.5, lpattern(dash)) yline(.25 .75, 
lpattern(dash)) mlabposition(3) title("Figure 12: Distribution of Countries 
by Groups", placement(nw)))  
graph export distribution_bal-groups.png, replace 
 
 
 
 
